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NIMBY TO NOPE—OR YESS?
K.K. DuVivier† & Thomas Witt †

On December 12, 2015, 195 governments around the world agreed to the
COP21 commitments to combat climate change. Pivotal to the success of these goals
is a shift from fossil-fuel energy generation to renewable resources. Wind power is
one of the largest renewable energy generation sources in the United States and has
the greatest potential for future development.
While wind energy generation has enjoyed some of the most impressive gains in
development of new capacity, reaching future goals will face more challenges. In
addition to resource potential, wind development is also confined to locations that
meet the sweet spot of being located near transmission lines and consumer load. As
the number of favorable locations diminishes, the regulatory regimes for wind
become increasingly important.
This Article is the result of NSF research to carefully catalogue and categorize
wind siting regulation across the United States. It goes beyond previous efforts in this
regard because it further examines the effectiveness of various regulatory regimes in
the context of litigation that has resulted from one method in contrast to another.
Based on this review, saying YESS 1 to a statewide siting regime for wind appears to
be the best solution for counteracting NIMBY 2 reactions to wind development and
avoiding a NOPE 3 result that could seriously thwart the COP 21 goals.
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1 YESS stands for “Yes, an Emphasis on Statewide Siting.”
2 NIMBY stands for “Not In My Back Yard.”
3 NOPE stands for “Not On Planet Earth.”
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INTRODUCTION
Alarm about the growing impact of carbon emissions on climate
led to the First World Climate Conference in Geneva in 1979 4 and the
creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in
1988. 5 The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, issued in 2014, showed a
ninety-five percent probability consensus by the scientists involved that
human activity was the principal cause of warming since the 1950s.6
This scientific evidence, along with catastrophic weather conditions that
could be linked to global warming, pushed the political dial enough to
result in an historic agreement at the twenty-first session of the
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (COP21). 7 On December 12, 2015, representatives
from 195 nations signed the COP21 accord, which commits nearly every
country around the globe to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. 8 Generation of electricity from renewable energy sources is a
key strategy for meeting the COP21 GHG goals. 9
A.

Growth of Wind Power

In the United States, wind power is second only to hydropower in
the renewable generation category, accounting for 4.4% out of the total
13.5% percent of U.S. electricity generated by all renewable sources in
2014. 10 One reason for wind’s popularity is price. The cost of generating
4 Spencer Weart, The Discovery of Global Warming: Impacts of Climate Change, AM. INST.
PHYSICS, https://www.aip.org/history/climate/impacts.htm (last updated Jan. 2017).
5 Id.
6 A Strong Scientific Consensus, UNITED NATIONS & CLIMATE CHANGE, http://
www.un.org/climatechange/the-science (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
7 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement,
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/
l09r01.pdf.
8 Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-change-accord-paris
.html? _r=0; see U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 7.
9 KATHERINE ROSS & THOMAS DAMASSA, WORLD RES. INST., ASSESSING THE POST-2020
CLEAN ENERGY LANDSCAPE (2015), http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/WRI-OCN_
Assessing-Post-2020-Clean-Energy-Landscape.pdf.
10 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, 2014
RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA BOOK 10 (2015) [hereinafter 2014 RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA
BOOK], http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/64720.pdf (hydropower represented 6.3%, wind
4.4%, biomass 1.6%, solar .8%, and geothermal .4%).
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electricity from wind power declined forty-three percent between 2009
and 2012. 11 As a result, wind power may be the lowest cost source for
electricity generation even as compared to fossil fuels. 12
U.S. wind power capacity has exploded over the last decade from
6.7 gigawatts in 2004 13 to almost seventy gigawatts by the end of 2014. 14
In comparison to conventional hydropower, which requires the
disruption of entire ecosystems and the flooding of large swaths of
land, 15 wind has greater potential for future development with
comparatively little environmental impact. 16
Wind energy charges forward as a viable, clean, and renewable
resource that has the capacity to generate power without many of the
issues raised by other energy sources. Wind farms, once constructed,
generate no waste and produce no emissions. Abundant wind resources
are available in most regions of the United States, and much of that
wind is in economically depressed rural areas. 17 Additionally, Congress’s
renewal in late 2015 of the Production Tax Credit for wind eliminates
much uncertainty of investment, ensuring wind’s continued growth.
B.

NSF Research and this Article

Despite the impressive past growth of new wind capacity,
developing enough wind power in the United States to meet the COP21
and President Obama’s related Clean Power Plan goals 18 will require
11 Michael Goggin, Earth Day Good News: Wind Energy’s Costs Decline, Contributions to
Energy Mix Grow, INTO THE WIND: AWEA BLOG (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.aweablog.org
/earth-day-good-news-wind-energys-costs-decline-contributions-to-energy-mix-grow.
12 LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS—VERSION 8.0 (2014), https://
www.lazard.com/media/1777/levelized_cost_of_energy_-_version_80.pdf.
13 2014 RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA BOOK, supra note 10, at 23.
14 Id.; see also LESLEY HUNTER ET AL., AM. COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY, THE
OUTLOOK FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY IN AMERICA (2014), http://acore.org/files/pdfs/ACORE_
Outlook_for_RE_2014.pdf.
15 See generally Tasneem Abbasi & S.A. Abbasi, Small Hydro and the Environmental
Implications of Its Extensive Utilization, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS 2134
(2011); Dan Tarlock, The Legal-Political Barriers to Ramping Up Hydro, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
259, 261 (2011).
16 Dennis Y.C. Leung & Yuan Yang, Wind Energy Development and its Environmental
Impact: A Review, 16 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS 1031, 1036–37 (2012).
17 See generally K.K. DuVivier, Rural Wind Windfalls, 23 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401 (2014)
[hereinafter DuVivier, Rural Wind Windfalls]; K.K. DuVivier, Animal, Vegetable, Mineral—
Wind? The Severed Wind Power Rights Conundrum, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 69, 70–71 (2009).
18 For a general overview of President Obama’s stated goals for the Clean Power plan, see A
Historic Commitment to Protecting the Environment and Addressing the Impacts of Climate
Change, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-record/climate [https://web.
archive.org/web/20170101011541/https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-record/climate]. For an
overview of the goals of the Clean Power Plan, see Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan Overview, U.S.
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new strategies. First generation wind farms have been sited not only
where there is sufficient resource potential, but also in locations that
meet the sweet spot of being in areas with incentives and near
transmission lines and consumer load. 19 As the demand for wind
development increases and the number of favorable locations
diminishes, the regulatory regimes for wind become increasingly
important. 20
As part of this NSF project, a research team carefully catalogued
and categorized wind siting regulation across the United States. In
addition, the team looked at all litigation arising from statewide
regulations. 21 While the number of cases from which to draw lessons is
relatively few and primarily limited to more densely populated states, 22
this analysis supports the conclusion that wind siting regimes with some
form of statewide control help counteract NIMBY reactions to wind
development. Collective NIMBY reactions have global consequences if
all or a significant number of communities refuse to embrace wind
power. Then NIMBY can turn to NOPE, which could seriously thwart
the COP21 climate goals.
This Article first provides some background about the unique
impacts created by large-scale wind projects, 23 and the potential legal
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-powerplan-overview (last visited Feb. 14, 2017).
19 K.K. DuVivier et al., Transmission and Transport of Energy in the Western U.S. and
Canada: A Law and Policy Road Map, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 387, 397 (2016); see also Marc Sydnor,
Determinants of Wind Energy Deployment: Infrastructures, Policies, Resources or Economics?
20 (Nov. 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Denver), http://
digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1065 (listing demand, transmission, retirements, RPSs, property
taxes as key drivers).
20 See generally 2014 RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA BOOK, supra note 10, at 18–40.
21 Although word searches were made to uncover all lawsuits related to wind development,
it was beyond the scope of the NSF research funding to catalogue all local level regulation or to
track down any conflicts that were not reflected in reported state or federal court cases.
22 See U.S. Wind Energy State Facts, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/
resources/statefactsheets.aspx?itemnumber=890 (last updated July 2016) (hover the cursor over
each state in order to see its ranking in terms of cumulative installed capacity). The authors
note that the following states are the highest for wind power production, in order of cumulative
installed capacity: (1) Texas; (2) Iowa; (3) California; (4) Oklahoma; (5) Illinois; (6) Kansas; (7)
Minnesota; (8) Oregon; (9) Washington; (10) Colorado; (11) North Dakota; (12) Indiana; (13)
New York; (14) Michigan; (15) Wyoming; (16) Pennsylvania; (17) New Mexico; (18) South
Dakota; (19) Idaho; (20) Nebraska; (21) Montana; (22) Maine; (23) Wisconsin; (24) West
Virginia; (25) Missouri; (26) Ohio; (27) Utah; (28) Arizona; (29) Hawaii; (30) Maryland; (31)
New Hampshire; (32) Nevada; (33) Vermont; (34) Massachusetts; (35) Alaska; (36) Tennessee;
(37) Rhode Island; (38) New Jersey; (39) Connecticut; (40) Delaware. Id. While none of these
states regulate wind siting purely at the state level, the authors have interviewed parties
involved in wind development who have indicated that the certainty of statewide regulation
would be a benefit, especially when NIMBY concerns arise.
23 A wind project with less than five megawatts (MW) in capacity might be considered to
serve on-site users or small communities, but anything larger will generally be selling power to
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issues they raise. Part II then reviews some of the NIMBY problems that
arise from the default position of allowing complete or heavy local
control of wind project siting. This Part examines several Pennsylvania
cases in depth to illustrate some of the specific concerns. Part III uses
some specific state laws and cases to illustrate various YESS regimes and
their advantages. Finally, Part IV employs the changing laws in New
York to provide a case study comparing the NIMBY impacts of local
controls to the alternative of a YESS regime.
I. BACKGROUND
Most wind energy generation projects in the United States are
utility-scale. This is driven by economics—lower cost per unit of
electricity through economies of scale—and by the need to have
unobstructed wind, which makes distributed wind in more densely
populated areas less economically feasible. As a result, developing a
wind farm can have substantial impacts on a local community. Public
acceptance or animosity varies across the country and can vary from
municipality to municipality, raising threats of NIMBY responses. 24
A.

Wind Power Benefits

Many of wind’s impacts are positive. In comparison to other power
sources, wind generation not only avoids air pollutants and greenhouse
gases, but also is entirely emission free. Wind power achieves this
without any threats of explosions or toxic residues. 25 Furthermore, coal,
natural gas, and nuclear power plants employ a steam cycle that requires
water for the boilers and for cooling. In contrast, wind power is one of
the wholesale market. See, e.g., ENVTL. LAW INST., STATE ENABLING LEGISLATION FOR
COMMERCIAL-SCALE WIND POWER SITING AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ROLE 1 & n.1 (2011)
[hereinafter ELI 2011]. This threshold is not universal, and in some situations, twenty or
twenty-five MW is used to define “utility-scale” wind. Id.
24 NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS, PUT IT THERE!—WIND ENERGY & WINDPARK SITING AND ZONING BEST PRACTICES AND GUIDANCE FOR STATES 5 (2012) [hereinafter
NARUC], http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/539BA6EE-2354-D714-5157-359DDD67CE7F.
25 See Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1703, 1710 (2012) (describing how environmental laws written for fossil
fuel generation presume that a certain amount of harm must be “permitted”); see also
Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier: Climate Change, Natural Resource
Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 63, 70 (2011); Hannah Wiseman et al.,
Formulating a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables Component, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
827 (2011); cf. Steven Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges to Accommodate
New Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977, 979 (2009) (“[F]ocus[ing] on how the
new power grid must be modified and the legal and policy challenges this poses.”).
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the only methods of generating electricity that does not require water—
which is especially beneficial in areas with scarce water resources and
which reduces any possibility of water pollution.
While wind power is generally developed in utility-scale farms,
these tend to be significantly smaller in capacity size than traditional
electricity generation plants. For example, while large coal-fired and
nuclear power plants in the United States have had capacities exceeding
1,000 MW, most U.S. terrestrial, or land-based, wind farms have been
below 100 MW in size.
Finally, wind development has significant financial benefits
including more local jobs, lease payments to landowners, and increased
tax revenues to local communities. 26 In addition to these direct benefits,
wind development can result in indirect benefits—like increased activity
for financers, suppliers, and local industries 27—and induced benefits for
local restaurants and support services. 28 Beside these economic benefits,
wind has environmental advantages in comparison to almost any other
source of electricity generation, including the possibility of improving
crop production. 29
B.

Wind Power Challenges

Despite these benefits, wind has its challenges, including some that
are unique to wind development. This Section will address (1) Land
Area; (2) Tower Heights and Aesthetics; (3) Wildlife and other unique
wind issues; and (4) NIMBYism.

26 DuVivier, Rural Wind Windfalls, supra note 17, at 403 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
ECONOMIC BENEFITS, CARBON DIOXIDE (CO2) EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS, AND WATER
CONSERVATION BENEFITS FROM 1,000 MEGAWATTS (MW) OF NEW WIND POWER IN KANSAS
(2008) [hereinafter WIND POWER IN KANSAS], http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/43517.pdf).
27 Id. at 404–05 (citing WIND POWER IN KANSAS, supra note 26, at 1).
28 Id. at 405 & n.36 (referencing the JEDI: Jobs and Economic Development Impacts Models,
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/jedi (last visited Feb. 14, 2017)).
29 Id. at 412–13 (citing Daniel A. Rajewski et al., Crop Wind Energy Experiment (CWEX):
Observations of Surface-Layer, Boundary Layer, and Mesoscale Interactions with a Wind Farm,
94 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 655, 661 (2013); Cathy Proctor, An Agricultural
Windfall, DENV. BUS. J., Dec. 24, 2010, at A3; Somnath Baidya Roy et al., Impacts of Wind
Farms on Surface Air Temperatures, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 17899, 17899
(2010)); Daniel T. Kaffine, Good Neighbors? Microclimate Impacts of Wind Farms on Crop
Yields (working paper 2017) (on file with author).
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Land Area

Although wind developments are usually smaller in capacity than
fossil-fuel generation plants, they generally can impact more land area.
For example, the actual land area occupied by the bases of wind turbines
or other facilities is relatively small, with the average of about 0.4
hectares per megawatt of capacity. However, the fact that the turbines
are dispersed over wide areas to collect the winds without impacting
other turbines means that the total wind plant areas are much larger. 30
For example, a ten MW wind farm could impact an area of
approximately four square miles.
2.

Tower Heights and Aesthetics

One of the most common objections is the aesthetic impact of wind
turbines on scenic views or disruption of the character of residential
neighborhoods or rural areas. Wind power does not use water, but it
must be sited where the resource is available, which frequently can be
along imposing, highly visible ridge tops. This is in contrast to
conventional power plants that are tied to water resources, but therefore
can be sited in a variety of less visible locations in valleys. In addition,
wind towers can be immense. The height and size of these towers, and
their placement in exposed areas capable of accessing winds can result
in a substantial visual footprint.
Wind tower heights have been growing in recent decades, from less
than 100 feet in the 1980s and 1990s to an average of approximately 300
feet today. 31 Furthermore, terrestrial turbines are projected to reach 500
feet in the near future. 32 As they grow, the impacts will be broader. 33
Wind farms can include tens to hundreds of these turbines that tower
over existing vegetation, homes, and almost any other human
construction within the landscape.
30 PAUL DENHOLM ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., LAND-USE REQUIREMENTS OF
MODERN WIND POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 9 (2009), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy09osti/45834.pdf. Concerns over the land needed for growing energy demands, or “energy
sprawl,” is a growing concern for some communities, particularly in more populous areas
where demand is high and available land is low. See Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with
Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547, 553–54 (2010).
31 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, WIND VISION: A NEW ERA FOR WIND POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES fig. ES.2-5 (2015), http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/wv_executive_summary_
overview_and_key_chapter_findings_final.pdf.
32 See id.
33 K.K. DuVivier, Wind Power Growing Pains, 21 CHAP. NEXUS J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2016)
[hereinafter DuVivier, Wind Power Growing Pains].
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Furthermore, the need to place them in areas with few obstructions
to incoming wind, such as in open plains or along ridge tops and
mountains, makes the turbines visible over great distances, often
contrasting greatly with their surroundings. 34 While some may find
them aesthetically pleasing, opponents argue large-scale wind farms
threaten the qualities that give some properties their value in areas of
high residential density or with strong recreational values. 35
3.

Wildlife and Other Unique Wind Concerns

Environmental groups also raise concerns about wind turbine
impacts on wildlife, especially bat and avian species. These impacts are
sufficient to align these groups against wind, despite wind’s other
environmental benefits. Not only do the turbines interfere with wildlife
when in operation, the construction and maintenance of the turbines
and related infrastructure results in increased traffic, and noise that
disturbs both wildlife and humans. 36
Finally, opponents challenge wind projects for impacts such as
interference with communication networks, noise generation, ice
throws, 37 or shadow flickers. 38

See Avi Brisman, The Aesthetics of Wind Energy Systems, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2005).
Maine provides strong examples of this, including an aesthetic provision in its Wind
Energy Act. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-a, § 3402(2)(C) (2010). This provision has been the
subject of several legal challenges, questioning whether large-scale wind projects in scenic or
recreational areas violate the challengers’ rights under the Equal Protection Act. See, e.g.,
Friends of Lincoln Lakes v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 989 A.2d 1128 (Me. 2010). In addition, some
studies have shown that the visibility of wind turbines is a strong cause of public opposition. See
Robert G. Sullivan et al., Wind Turbine Visibility and Visual Impact Threshold Distances in
Western Landscapes (2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://visualimpact.anl.gov/windvitd/
docs/WindVITD.pdf; Jacob Ladenburg & Jens-Olav Dahlgaard, Attitudes Threshold Levels and
Cumulative Effects of the Daily Wind Turbine Encounters (USAEE-IAEE, Working Paper No.
11-069, 2011), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jacob_Ladenburg/publication/228264644_
Attitudes_Threshold_Levels_and_Cumulative_Effects_of_the_Daily_Wind_Turbines_
Encounter/links/00b49526793db7ef9b000000.pdf.
36 Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying America’s Energy Future: The Future of Renewable
Wind Power, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 530–31 (2008).
37 The following cases demonstrate landowners challenging local zoning ordinances on a
myriad of state and federal claims that include damage to property and health due to ice
throws. See, e.g., Trude v. Town Bd. of Cohocton, No. 95,747, 2007 WL 2811372, at *3 (N.Y.
Sup Ct. Sept. 24, 2007); Bomba v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Princeton, 2005 WL 2106162, at *2
(Mass. Land Ct. Sept. 1, 2005).
38 Peter Schworm & David Filipov, Flickering Shadows from Wind Turbines Draw
Complaints, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 5, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/04/04/
turbine-flicker-effect-draws-complaints/UKgf7nOwMHm8CWAtZ47V5L/story.html; see also
Muscarello v. Winnebago Cty. Bd., 702 F.3d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 2012).
34
35
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NIMBYism

Even a single wind turbine can change the character of an area, and
wind farms are large infrastructure projects that might be resisted by
those who oppose any type of industrial use in their neighborhoods. The
regulatory fixes that might appease opponents of other types of
industrial development may not work in the context of wind. For
example, shielding or fencing, to hide from view a factory or
conventional energy plant, cannot be employed for wind because of the
height of a wind tower and the impracticability of blocking the very
wind resource needed to run the turbines.
While these unique challenges raise legitimate concerns with
proposed wind farms, the problems can be exacerbated by NIMBY
views, even by people who support renewable energy but want it to be
somewhere else. Thus, while the impacts of wind development are
frequently part of a state, local, or even federal review process, how that
review process is structured can leave issues unresolved or result in
processes that can thwart reasonable development. 39
While conventional fossil-fuel generation plants have faced similar
NIMBY challenges in the past, 40 states have created regulatory regimes
that significantly curtail opposition to these sources of generation. For
example, California’s Energy Commission was created in 1974 because
of local opposition to the proposed siting of nuclear power plants
throughout the state. 41 Some of the advantages of these alternative siting
regimes are one-stop shopping with a single state agency, alternative
review processes that preempt local control, and more predictable and
limited judicial review. 42
The idea of dividing wind development projects by size, and having
different regulatory paths, has some advantages. 43 Divisions by size
allow small wind developers, such as ranches or small end-users seeking
a single tower, to avoid the possibly long and expensive statewide review
in favor of a review process designed for considering the impacts of
large-scale projects. However, either because wind developments are
39 Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241 (2011)
[hereinafter Outka, Footprint] (reviewing some of the challenges presented by siting, and siting
regulations and approaches taken by the federal governments and some states to expedite siting
approvals).
40 For an overview of the local challenges to fossil-fuel power plants see, for example, Glenn
Blomquist, The Effect of Electric Utility Power Plant Location on Area Property Value, 50 LAND
ECON. 97 (1974).
41 K.K. DuVivier, The Superagency Solution, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 189, 197–98 (2014)
[hereinafter DuVivier, The Superagency Solution].
42 Id. at 202–03.
43 For more discussion of the size divisions, see infra Section II.B.
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smaller than many conventional fossil-fuel plants, or because of other
special characteristics distinguishing wind development from most
fossil-fuel generating plants, 44 many states that have statewide siting for
almost all other sources of electricity generation do not cover wind. 45
II. U.S. WIND ENERGY REGULATION
While financial incentives have been provided at the federal level,
primarily through the Production Tax Credit, 46 legislation to regulate
the construction, operation, and decommissioning of wind projects—as
well as to protect the interests of developers, lessors, and neighbors—has
generally been handled at the state and local level. 47

44 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. ET AL., ELECTRICITY FROM RENEWABLE RESOURCES: STATUS,
PROSPECTS, AND IMPEDIMENTS 67–132 (2010). Wind and photovoltaic solar are the only two
current utility-scale technologies that do not require water for the generation of electricity.
Other “thermoelectric” forms of power generation, nuclear, coal, natural gas, and even
concentrating solar thermal (CSP), first boil water to steam to turn the electric generator. See P.
TORCELLINI, N. LONG & R. JUDKOFF, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., CONSUMPTIVE WATER
USE FOR U.S. POWER PRODUCTION (2003), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy04osti/33905.pdf.
45 For example, the California Energy Commission regulates the siting of all other sources
of electricity generation except wind and solar power. DuVivier, The Superagency Solution,
supra note 41, at 199–200.
46 42 U.S.C. § 13317 (2012); see also Production Tax Credit, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N,
http://www.awea.org/production-tax-credit (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
47 This Article is focused on U.S. terrestrial wind development on private lands, which, as of
2012, still accounts for 98.6% of total U.S. installed capacity. See Public Lands and Wind Energy,
AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/Issues/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=858 (last
visited Nov. 15, 2016). As of 2015, the United States had yet to complete the construction of a
single offshore wind turbine, although several have been proposed and are in various stages of
development. See State Activities, BOEM, https://www.boem.gov/Renewable-Energy-StateActivities (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). Because much offshore development is projected to occur
in federal waters, the federal government will have a much greater role in regulating that
development. See Jeremy Firestone et al., Regulating Offshore Wind Power and Aquaculture:
Messages from Land and Sea, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 78–82 (2004). Federal regulation
is also required for projects that take place on federal lands, or that trigger existing regulations
through impacts to federal waters, endangered species, federal highways, or make use of federal
funding. The American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) reports that only 1.4% of total wind
energy capacity was installed on public lands through 2012. The U.S. Forest Service (USFS)
manages 193 million acres of National Forest and Grasslands across the country. USFS has only
approved one 30 MW wind project: Deerfield Wind in Vermont on federal lands. As of May
2015, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has recognized 20.6 million acres as having wind
potential and authorized forty wind energy development projects. See Wind Energy, BLM,
https://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/wind_energy.html (last updated Apr. 21, 2016).
Again, this Article focuses on state and local regulations required for wind developments, and
not federal regulations that may be triggered by specific projects. State and local regulations
vary substantially in what areas are specifically regulated. For an overview of different state
approaches see NARUC, supra note 24, at 48 app. A.
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Why Siting Matters

The efficiency and viability of wind energy projects is not solely
determined by the siting of towers. However, siting may be one of the
most critical decisions made for a project. 48 Turbine heights allowing
greater blade size 49 and the location of towers factor into a wind farm’s
efficiency, along with the wind conditions, 50 prevailing wind direction,
wake effect, 51 and local topography. 52 Developers conduct careful
studies to find the most efficient arrangement of towers so as to
maximize the wind potential for the project and minimize the wakes to
prevent one tower from adversely affecting the efficiency of a
neighboring tower in the area of the project or a competing project.
Unfortunately for wind developers, siting decisions also have the
potential to raise some of the strongest regulatory and legal challenges.
It is the placement of the towers themselves that often raises the ire of
local residents or their representative governments. New technologies
and advanced wind modeling can determine the most efficient
placement of towers—one that yields the greatest and most consistent
energy based on prevailing wind patterns. 53 However, final siting
48 An Environmental Law Institute (ELI) study cites ELIZABETH DORIS ET AL., NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., STATE OF THE STATES 2009: RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
AND THE ROLE OF POLICY, TECH. REP. NO. NREL/TP-6A2-46667 (Oct. 2009), http://
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46667.pdf, and notes that it is useful, but glaringly omits
discussion of siting policies. ELI 2011, supra note 23, at 1.
49 See also, e.g., Does Wind Turbine Blade Length Really Matter, ORENDA ENERGY
SOLUTIONS (Aug. 6, 2013), http://orendaenergy.com/does-wind-turbine-blade-length-reallymatter. See generally DuVivier, Wind Power Growing Pains, supra note 33.
50 See, e.g., BRUCE BAILEY & RICH OSSIBOFF, AWS TRUEPOWER, ADVANCED
CHARACTERIZATION OF WIND RESOURCES IN SELECTED FOCUS AREAS OF CALIFORNIA 37–46
(2010), http://www.energy.ca.gov/2013publications/CEC-500-2013-155/CEC-500-2013-155.pdf
(describing the impacts of unusual weather events in Chapter 5).
51 Wake effect is the result of the wind energy generation process. The wind flowing
through the turbine loses energy and becomes turbulent, leaving a wake of turbulent and
diminished wind energy on the downwind side. Turbines located within that wake will suffer
from diminished capacity. For further explanation of wake effect, see Kimberly E. Diamond &
Ellen J. Crivella, Wind Turbine Wakes, Wake Effect Impacts, and Wind Leases: Using Solar
Access Laws as the Model for Capitalizing on Wind Rights During the Evolution of Wind Policy
Standards, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 195 (2011); and Troy Rule, A Downwind View of the
Cathedral: Using Rule Four to Allocate Wind Rights, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207 (2009).
52 See, e.g., Wei Tian, Ahmet Ozbay & Hui Hu, Terrain Effects on Characteristics of Surface
Wind and Wind Turbine Wakes, 126 PROCEDIA ENGINEERING 542 (2015).
53 New technologies, including the use of portable SODAR and LIDAR, and advanced
Geographic Information System (GIS)-based wind modeling systems allow developers to
accurately site turbines based on long-term wind viability. The use of these technologies and
new models for analysis continue to allow developers a more accurate evaluation of wind
resources. For examples, see Stefano Grassi et al., Large Scale Technical and Economical
Assessment of Wind Energy Potential with a GIS Tool: Case Study Iowa, 45 ENERGY POL’Y 73
(2012) (describing new GIS modeling systems for evaluating wind efficiency for turbine siting);
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decisions can be a source of conflict between proponents and
challengers of proposed projects, and siting is often strongly influenced
by property ownership, municipal jurisdictions or regulations, setbacks,
aesthetic or noise considerations, or environmental factors. Siting has
continued to be one of the most significant impediments to the growth
of the industry, and complicated regulatory regimes can make
complicated siting decisions all but impossible. 54
When siting individual turbines, promoting efficient siting while
minimizing local concerns can be challenging. Yet, the problems
increase dramatically when siting large utility-scale projects that can
include tens or even hundreds of wind turbines that cross jurisdictional
boundaries. 55 Wind energy regulation, therefore, should seek to find a
balance that promotes wind energy development by allowing siting that
maximizes the efficiency of wind energy generation, limits conflicts
between neighboring developers or between wind energy generation
and competing land uses, and avoids, minimizes, or mitigates adverse
impacts to the public generated directly or indirectly by a project. 56
B.

Why Size Matters

Some states have dual regulatory paths for wind projects,
depending on the size of the overall undertaking. For example, many of
these states allow local control for smaller-scale wind projects while
granting authority for large wind projects to a state agency or utility
board. 57 The size of the project is most commonly measured by total
nameplate capacity, although some states have used alternate measures
such as acreage impacted or total number of turbines. 58
and see also Matthew A. Lackner et al., The Round Robin Site Assessment Method: A New
Approach to Wind Energy Site Assessment, 33 RENEWABLE ENERGY 2019 (2008).
54 See Outka, Footprint, supra note 39, at 242.
55 Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
477, 493–94 (2011) (identifying the need for regulation to help restrict challenges to siting wind
turbines).
56 Recognizing the delays that siting approvals can cause, and the impacts on development,
some states have attempted to create streamlined reviews for wind siting. California’s Executive
Order S-14-08 created a one-stop permitting process for renewable projects, and Maine’s
Expedited Permitting of Grid Scale Wind Energy Development allowed for some expedited
process in unorganized parts of the state. For a more complete review of these provisions and
other streamlined siting process, see Outka, Footprint, supra note 39, at 269–83.
57 The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners’ (NARUC) study of wind
regulations across the United States shows sixteen states that determine siting based on the size
of the project. NARUC, supra note 24, at 6 tbl.1.
58 In addition to the 0.5 MW limit discussed later in this section, Wyoming also allows local
governments to regulate projects with fewer than thirty turbines. WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-5502, 35-12-102 (West 2007). Maine allows local siting for projects that will impact fewer than
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The dividing lines between large and small-scale projects vary
significantly from one state to another. This can have a dramatic impact
on how sites are regulated. For example, Connecticut allows local siting
only for projects with a nameplate, or potential generating capacity of
less than one MW. 59 Larger wind projects require approval from the
Connecticut Siting Council. Because most single utility-scale wind
turbines have a nameplate capacity of over one MW, 60 this means that
local entities in Connecticut only have authority over the smallest wind
projects of likely no more than one turbine. All other wind
developments would therefore fall under the authority of a state siting
council. 61
In contrast, Massachusetts allows local siting for projects smaller
than 100 MW in nameplate capacity. 62 Wind energy development in
Massachusetts has generally consisted of small to medium sized
projects, and as of 2009, not a single terrestrial wind project larger than
100 MW had been constructed in Massachusetts. 63 Although
Massachusetts has a centralized authority for larger projects, the only
projects large enough to fall under that authority have been offshore

twenty acres. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3451(8); tit. 38, § 482.2 (2010). The other
fourteen states that divide projects by size use nameplate capacity: Iowa (twenty-five MW),
IOWA CODE ANN. § 476A.2 (West 2009); Kentucky (local under ten MW; both state and local
over ten MW), KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.216 (West 2006); Massachusetts (local under 100
MW), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §69G–69H (West 2003); North Dakota (under 0.5 MW
as of 2011), N.D. ADMIN. CODE 69-06 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 49-22-03(5) (West
2011); Oregon (under thirty-five MW unless one elects to use the state siting process), OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 469.320(8) (West 2016); Rhode Island (local under forty MW) 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 42-98-11, -11(d) (West 2014); South Dakota (local under 100 MW), S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 49-41B-2, -4 (2004); Virginia (local under 100 MW) VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1197.5
(West 2011), § 56-46.1(I) (West 2009) (as amended in 2009).
59 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-50k, -50a (West 2013) (allowing “fuel cells built within the
state with a generating capacity of two hundred fifty kilowatts or less,” and “fuel cells built out
of state with a generating capacity of ten kilowatts or less,” to forgo obtaining a state
certificate).
60 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Utility-Scale Wind, WINDEXCHANGE, http://apps2. eere. energy.
gov/wind/windexchange/utility-scale-wind.asp (last updated Jan. 25, 2017) (defining utilityscale wind projects as turbines larger than 1 MW).
61 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-50k(a).
62 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69G–69H (West 2003); EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY &
ENVTL. AFFAIRS, RENEWABLE ENERGY SITING STUDY (2009), http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/
doer/renewables/wind/wind-siting-study-04-15-09.pdf.
63 See id. at 5–2; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§ 69G–69H. Washington and
New Mexico allow even larger projects to fall within the bounds of local siting authority. See
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-9-3(B)-(H) (West 2015) (allowing local regulation for projects smaller
than 300,000 KW [300 MW]); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.50.020 (West 2001) (requiring state
approval for power generation facilities exceeding 350,000 KW [350 MW]).
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projects falling outside Massachusetts jurisdiction, none of which have
been built. 64
The dividing line between large and small projects can impact how
projects are proposed within the state. North Dakota initially divided
large and small-scale projects at 60 MW. 65 However, legislators found
that too many developers were breaking projects up into smaller pieces
to intentionally come in under the 60 MW threshold just to avoid state
regulation. 66 In an effort to stop developers from sneaking in under the
limit, North Dakota dramatically reduced the threshold capacity to 0.5
MW, 67 and now only individual home turbines are sited locally. Any
utility-scale facilities are now regulated by the state. 68
C.

The Default

Without a centralized set of federal standards, wind regulation
across the country consists of a patchwork of diverse state and local laws
and regulations that employ different tools in an attempt to strike the
balance between promoting wind and protecting local interests. The
diversity in these regulations defies easy classification, although several
studies have attempted to do just that. 69

64 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69H. The proposed Cape Wind Project has a total
nameplate capacity of 468 MW making it large enough to fall under the authority of the Energy
Facilities Siting Board; however, the project is outside the limits of Massachusetts jurisdiction
and falls under the regulatory authority of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM).
See Cape Wind, BOEM, https://www.boem.gov/Renewable-Energy-Program/Studies/CapeWind.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). As a result, although viewed as a Massachusetts project
over 100 MW, the Energy Facilities Siting Board has not been charged with regulating the
turbine siting, although they have been involved in some of the related transmission
installation. See FAQs: Permitting Process and Cape Wind, CAPE WIND, https://
www.capewind.org/faqs/permitting-process-and-cape-wind (last visited Feb. 16, 2017). See
generally All. to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 932 N.E.2d 787
(Mass. 2010).
65 NARUC, supra note 24, at A-72.
66 Id. The Energy Conversion and Transmission Facility Siting General Provisions were
amended most recently in 2011. Id. This amendment closed a “‘loophole’ that allowed wind
developers to avoid the state siting provisions by breaking up larger wind projects into smaller
ones simply to keep under the minimum capacity threshold.” Id. “Prior to this amendment,
North Dakota PSC had authority to review energy conversion facilities for projects over 60
MW.” Id.
67 Id.
68 See N.D. ADMIN. CODE 69-06 (2013) for provisions regulating siting authority over wind
energy conversion facilities defined under N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 49-22-03 (West 2011), as a
wind facility larger than 0.5 MW in capacity. See also NARUC, supra note 24, at A-72.
69 NARUC and ELI have both developed classifications of wind energy statutes across the
several states. NARUC, supra note 24, at 6–16; ELI 2011, supra note 23, at 5–15. In addition,
several law articles have also attempted to classify the means that states have used to regulate
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Research uncovered several previous efforts to catalogue wind
regulations. 70 The National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners (NARUC) study, published in 2012, looked at
characteristics of wind energy regulation across the United States and
how these regulations address various aspects of project siting and
project approval. 71 While the NARUC study provides a good starting
point for examining how different states have approached the question
of regulating wind energy projects, it also illustrates the diversity among
various state approaches and the difficulty in characterizing these data.
The major drawback of the NARUC data is that its categorizations
comparing state and federal approaches were too simplistic. 72
The Environmental Law Institute (ELI), in a 2011 study, similarly
looked at the different wind regulation approaches taken by the states. 73
In contrast to NARUC, the ELI took a more qualitative view, grouping
states into six different categories based on the balance of authority
between state and local government. 74 Each of the classification schemes
had their advantages and their flaws, but what they all illustrate, most
saliently, is that the prevailing method for wind siting in the United

wind energy. However, these groups vary in how they have categorized different state statutory
schemes.
70 See, e.g., Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy a Reality—Finding Ways to
Site Wind Power Facilities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 635 (2008); U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, Wind Energy Ordinances, WINDEXCHANGE, http://apps2.eere.energy.gov/wind/
windexchange/policy/ordinances.asp (last updated Nov. 24, 2015); CONSENSUS BLDG. INST., A
SURVEY OF WIND SITING REGULATIONS (2013), http://www.cbuilding.org/sites/default/files/
Wind%20Siting%20Regs%20by%20State.pdf; ELI 2011, supra note 23; NARUC, supra note 24;
see also Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New
Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1065–70, 1076–79, 1092
(2009) (describing local, state, and federal regulation of wind development and resulting
challenges to development, and arguing for a “federal wind siting policy”); Wiseman, supra
note 55 (describing the multiple layers of regulation and property rights that apply to large
renewable developments and arguing for regional energy boards).
71 NARUC, supra note 24, at 6 tbl.1 (NARUC study looked at fourteen different
characteristics: (1) MW Installed; (2) Primary Authority (Limit); (3) Primary or Secondary
State Authority; (4) State Energy Siting; (5) Primary Rule; (6) Evaluation Criteria; (7) Voluntary
Guidelines; (8) Model Ordinance; (9) Setback Standard; (10) Sound Standard; (11) Local
Ordinances; (12) Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard or “RPS”; (13) RPS In-State “Tilt”; and
(14) Renewable Energy Zone or “REZ”).
72 The NARUC study compared some of the different approaches, but did not generate any
broad categories of regulations outside of identifying whether a state placed the ultimate
authority at the state or local level. See id.
73 ELI 2011, supra note 23.
74 Id. at 5. The ELI categories include (1) Local siting with local autonomy; (2) Local siting
with a defined scope; (3) Dual authority with independent decisions; (4) Dual authority with
state preemption; (5) State siting incorporating local requirements; and (6) State siting. Id.
While these divisions are somewhat useful, the exceptions appear to consume the rules, so this
Article did not rely solely on the ELI categories.
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States is currently local control in a manner that provides little
protection against NIMBYism.
As of 2015, forty states had some form of utility wind power, and
sixteen of those states had over 1,000 MW of constructed wind
capacity. 75 In the absence of state legislation, local control is the default
because of the traditional role local governments have played in land use
decisions. 76 According to ELI, thirty-four states fit into this local control
category. 77
The default for purely local regulation raises at least four concerns,
illustrated by a slew of cases in Pennsylvania alone. 78 Pennsylvania
allows local governments the authority to review and approve wind
projects with no substantial input from state agencies. 79 Unlike most
states—where local regulation is authorized by default because of a total
absence of wind legislation or a lack of wind development—
Pennsylvania’s decision was intentional. 80 Through its Alternative
Energy Portfolio Standards Act, passed in 2004, Pennsylvania
established Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS) goals for the
state, but did not enact any provisions for how such facilities would be
regulated. 81 Instead, the authority for siting and approving wind
projects fell to local zoning laws typically at the county or municipal
level. 82
Recognizing the need for guidance, the State issued a Model Wind
Ordinance in 2006 to support local regulation of wind projects. 83 Only
75 U.S. Wind Energy State Facts, supra note 22. The American Wind Energy Association has
compiled an interactive resource that ranks all fifty states according to their current installed
wind capacity. Id. These figures do not account for projects currently seeking permits. Id. Ten
states currently are rated as having a megawatt capacity of zero and are unranked. Id. The
unranked states with no installed wind capacity as of July 2016 are: Florida, Louisiana,
Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Kentucky, Georgia, Mississippi, and
Arkansas. Id.
76 See Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 70, at 1065.
77 ELI 2011, supra note 23, at 6. These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. Id. In contrast,
NARUC lists twenty-six states as granting primary wind siting authority to local governments,
with an additional sixteen granting the authority for small projects. NARUC, supra note 24, at 6
tbl.1.
78 See Mark K. Dausch, Comment, Analyzing a Municipality’s Authority to Enact the Model
Ordinance for Wind Energy Facilities in Pennsylvania, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 47 (2006).
79 Id. at 47–48.
80 Id.
81 See S. 1030, 2003-2004, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004) (codified as amended at 73 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1648 (West 2008)).
82 See Dausch, supra note 78, at 47–48; NARUC, supra note 24, at A-81.
83 See Dausch, supra note 78, at 47.
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thirteen local Pennsylvania governments, however, have adopted any
wind-specific regulations, and most areas of the state currently operate
under general zoning laws with no wind-specific provisions. 84
Under Pennsylvania law, local governments have broad regulatory
authority through zoning. Local governments are prohibited from
passing laws that would completely exclude otherwise legitimate land
uses, but the burden falls to the party challenging the regulation to show
that it is exclusionary. 85 This would present a high burden for
development projects by potentially requiring a party to show that a
regulation would prohibit all wind projects anywhere within the
jurisdiction. While this limitation would prevent total bans, it places the
burden of proving a negative on the developer, which might make it
difficult to show that even unreasonable regulations are sufficiently
“exclud[ing] . . . otherwise legitimate [land] use[s].” 86
1.

Applying Non-Wind Regulations to Wind Development

When laws and regulations lag behind technological development,
they can serve to deter or hinder the development of that technology
even when all other factors—such as economics, public interest, and
government support—promote it. With a lack of wind specific laws in
place, development must rely on existing processes, which can
sometimes lead to bizarre results. 87 Is a wind turbine an accessory use
like a gazebo? If the local zoning regulation says that industrial facilities
need to be shielded by a fence, should that requirement be applied to
require a fence around wind turbines? These are a few of the questions
raised by two Pennsylvania cases addressing the application of nonwind regulations to wind development.
Tink-Wig Mountain Lake Forest Property Owners Association
v. Lackawaxen Township Zoning Hearing Board 88
In 2008, Lackawaxan Township had no wind specific provisions. 89
Therefore, when a property owner requested a permit to install a single
a.

See Wind Energy Ordinances, supra note 70.
See Dausch, supra note 78, at 48–49.
86 Dausch, supra note 78, at 48–49; see, e.g., Plaxton v. Lycoming Cty. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
986 A.2d 199, 205, 208 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
87 Donald Zillman et al., More than Tilting at Windmills, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 67 (2009)
(looking at the legal hurdles in developing wind energy in the United States, and examining
more proactive European approaches to regulating development).
88 Tink-Wig Mountain Lake Forest Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Lackawaxen Twp. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 986 A.2d 935 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
89 See id. at 938.
84
85
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wind turbine within a residential neighborhood, the Township Zoning
Officer reviewed the request under existing zoning regulations,
approving it as an “accessory use” on the property. 90
The local Property Owners Association challenged the decision,
arguing that rather than an “accessory use,” the turbine should be
considered a “conditional use” under the zoning laws and should have
been reviewed by a different local board, the Township Board of
Supervisors. 91 The Property Owners Association argued that the
“accessory use” provision of the zoning ordinance was intended for
things like gazebos and not for something as substantial as a wind
turbine. 92
The Township Zoning Officer defended his decision, arguing that
there were no express limits on what constituted an “accessory use.”93
Furthermore, because the turbine was providing an “essential service” to
the property owner, the Township Zoning Officer’s decision to apply
the “accessory use” provision was appropriate. 94
Lacking clear guidance for how to apply wind turbines to the
ordinance, the reviewing Commonwealth Court used an abuse of
discretion standard to analyze the zoning regulations and the definitions
of “accessory use” and “essential service,” ultimately holding that the
decision of the zoning board was appropriate and upholding the permit
for the wind turbine. 95
Tioga Preservation Group v. Tioga County Planning
Commission 96
In 2007, AES Armenia Mountain Wind proposed a large wind
farm consisting of 124 turbines and associated infrastructure in Tioga
County. 97 The Tioga County Planning Commission did not have any
wind-specific regulations, but it approved the project under existing
zoning regulations. 98 Tioga County’s general zoning rules required that
b.

Id. at 937.
Id. at 937–40.
92 Id. at 937–38 (nor did the zoning ordinance have any standards governing the siting of
the proposed turbine).
93 Id. at 938–39.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 941–43.
96 970 A.2d 1200 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
97 Id. at 1202.
98 Id.
90
91
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development projects be screened from view. 99 However the Planning
Commission granted AES a waiver to this requirement. 100
Local residents of Tioga County appealed, first to the Court of
Common Pleas and then to the Commonwealth Court. In addition to
questioning AES’s status as a proper applicant for the permit, the
challengers raised two arguments against the Commission’s actions.101
First, the challengers said the Commission needed to identify sections of
the ordinance from which it derived the specific conditions it imposed
on AES. 102 The court rejected this argument because the section of the
ordinance requiring specificity only applied when the governmental
body denies a land development application, not when it approves one,
as was the case here. 103
Second, the challengers argued that the Commission erred in
granting the fence waiver. Citing to Pennsylvania statutes, cases, and the
county ordinance itself, the court noted that “a governing body or
planning agency may administer waivers . . . from the literal compliance
of its ordinance where literal enforcement will exact undue hardship.” 104
AES’s application stated that fully screening the turbines was infeasible
because of the turbine heights and because fences would obstruct the
very wind flow needed to turn the turbine blades to generate
electricity. 105 The court, therefore, concluded that AES’s application met
the hardship test. 106
In addition, the court’s scope of review was limited to “error of law
or abuse of discretion.” 107 Based on this heightened standard, the court
held the Commission did not err, and affirmed its waiver of the
screening requirement. 108
In both the Tink-Wig and the Tioga Preservation cases, the wind
projects were allowed to move forward despite local challenges.
99 Id. (“Article VII, section 709.06 of the Tioga County Subdivision and Land Use
Ordinance . . . requires that natural screening or fencing be provided where an industrial
development abuts residential property or other incompatible uses.”).
100 Id. at 1202, 1205.
101 Id. at 1203.
102 Id. at 1204.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1204–05 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 503(8), 512.1(a); 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 10503(8), 10512.1(a); Article VII, section 704 and Article IX, section 902 of the
county ordinance). The cases cited held that a waiver was proper if the requirement “would
offer little or no additional benefit and where literal enforcement would frustrate the effect of
improvements.” Id. (citing Monroe Meadows Hous. P’ship, L.P. v. Mun. Council, 926 A.2d 548
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007); Ruf v. Buckingham Twp., 765 A.2d 1166 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001)).
105 Id. at 1205.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 1203 n.1.
108 Id. at 1205.
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However, the local decision making bodies were granted broad
discretion to interpret the non-wind regulations in ways that could
either promote or halt wind development. This discretion could swing
either way depending on the composition of the deciding authority and
the latest election.
2.

Lack of Regulations

Yet another Pennsylvania case illustrates the potential for costly
litigation when local regulations provide no guidance in an area.
In re Broad Mountain Development Co. 109: In 2008, Broad
Mountain Development Company, L.L.C., proposed a twenty to twentyeight wind turbine project within a Woodland-Conservation Zone
District in Pennsylvania. 110 Butler Township, which had the authority
over the zoning permit, had no specific regulation or guidance
regarding wind energy projects. 111 Despite this lack of guidance, the
Butler Township Zoning Officer approved Broad Mountain’s zoning
permit application during a zoning meeting on February 4, 2008. 112
The Zoning Officer’s activities in approving the permit included
several irregularities. First, he made the following note on the
application: “Zoning Permit Only. A wind energy facility is an allowable
activity in a Woodland Conservation (WC) Zoning District . . . .” 113 The
Zoning Officer later testified that he made the note to indicate he was
limiting the scope of approval. 114 In addition, “[f]or unknown reasons,
the Zoning Officer failed to include the issuance of this permit on his
report to the Board of Supervisors.” 115
In contrast, the developer left the February 2008 zoning hearing
believing that it had acquired the necessary permit that gave it the green
light to move forward on the project. 116 Four months after the hearing,
the company invested money to erect a meteorological tower to prepare
17 A.3d 434 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011).
Id. at 437. Counties can create Woodland Conservation Zones by incorporating natural
resource identification and protection into subdivision and development proposals through site
specific performance standards. Some Pennsylvania counties refer to them as “Model
Conservation Districts” (Lancaster County, PA) or “Rural Conservation Districts” (Berks
County, PA) For permitted uses, see Schuylkill County, Pa., Butler Township Zoning
Ordinance of 1997 art. IV, §§ 401.1–401.4 (Mar. 19, 2003), http://elibrary.pacounties.org/
Documents/Schuylkill_County/7;% 20Butler%20Township/4210710488mzo.pdf.
111 Broad Mountain, 17 A.3d at 437.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 437–38.
116 Id.
109
110
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a feasibility study. 117 This tower was approximately sixty meters tall and
visible around the area. 118 Then in February of 2009, over a year after
receiving its zoning permit, the developer filed a preliminary land
development plan for the wind farm. 119 The developer paid over $20,000
for its development plan review. 120
The developer’s activities in early 2009 started to get attention, and
a local newspaper carried a story about Broad Mountain’s project in
March of 2009. 121 Suddenly, local opponents awakened. The Zoning
Board was flooded with appeals against Broad Mountain’s permit at its
May 2009 meeting. 122 In response to ire from its constituents, the
Zoning Board revoked Broad Mountain’s permit. 123
Broad Mountain appealed the Zoning Board’s decision to revoke
the permit to the Court of Common Pleas. 124 When the trial court
affirmed the Zoning Board decision, Broad Mountain again appealed to
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. 125 The wind developer
claimed its right to the permit had vested because the neighboring
landowners, who objected in May of 2009, had not timely appealed to
the initial grant of the permit in February of 2008. 126 Pennsylvania law
provides that parties seeking reversal of a board approval must do so
within thirty days. 127
Both the trial court and the Commonwealth Court disagreed.128
The decision rode upon notice to the parties seeking reversal. 129 This
required close examination of the factual circumstances of the many
parties allowed to intervene. 130 The Zoning Officer’s irregularities about
not reporting the permit, and his notations, also complicated the factual
investigation. 131 Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the revocation

Id. at 438.
Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 438–39. The Butler Township Zoning Hearing Board, who initially approved the
permit application, granted an appeal of the zoning permit. In addition to determining that the
permit was not within the use permitted in the Woodland-Conservation Zone, the Board held
that AES did not construct the wind turbines prior to the expiration of the permit.
124 Id. at 439.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 441.
128 Id. at 445.
129 Id. at 443.
130 Id. at 439.
131 Id. at 437–38.
117
118
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of Broad Mountain’s permit despite its outlay of funds in reliance on the
standard process. 132
The local challenge that overturned the project, and the appeal by
the wind developer, highlights some of the difficulties in not having
specific procedures and standards for regulating wind projects. First,
unclear notice requirements left some local residents uninformed about
the project, thus vitiating their right to challenge the initial zoning board
approval. Second, because no clear guidelines for notice were defined by
the ordinance, it also opened the door to the wind developer’s legal
challenge. Finally, the wind developer here moved forward with costly
obligations and did not learn until more than three years after it thought
its permit had been approved that it could no longer go forward with
the project.
3.

Lack of Expertise

PPM Atlantic Renewable v. Fayette County Hearing Board 133: In
2007, PPM Atlantic sought to develop a twenty-four turbine wind farm
that fell within three different townships in Fayette County,
Pennsylvania. 134 One of the townships had its own specific zoning
provisions and regulated the project under those provisions. 135
However, two of the townships, Georges and Springhill, did not have
any wind provisions, so the zoning responsibility fell to Fayette
County. 136
Fayette County did have some wind specific provisions in its
zoning ordinance. 137 The county zoning provisions considered wind
turbines a “special exception” use in A-1 zones. 138 The PPM project was
in an A-1 zone, so it should have been subject to the thirteen specific
conditions for wind turbines in Fayette County’s ordinance. 139 PPM

Id. at 445.
This case went through several rounds of litigation. For a general factual overview and
procedural history, see No. 1431 C.D. 2010, 2014 WL 2156744 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 20, 2014).
134 PPM Atl. Renewable v. Fayette Cty. Zoning Hearing Bd., 13 Pa. D & C.5th 458, 461–62
(Pa. Ct. C.P. June 17, 2010).
135 Id. at 461.
136 Id. at 462.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. The conditions included “a minimum lot size, maximum height, setback, maximum
noise, ‘viewshed impact analysis,’ ‘biological resource survey,’ ‘best management practices’ to
minimize erosion, siltation and water contamination, aircraft warning lights, location relative
to airports, compliance with the National Historical Preservation Act,” and a decommissioning
standard. Id.
132
133
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sought some variances to optimize the efficiency of the wind project.140
These included siting towers the “maximum distance from residences”;
ensuring performance based on wind measurements; orienting towers
based on prevailing winds; and maximizing the elevation of towers.141
Additionally, setback variances were only requested from the property
boundaries of two participating property owners, and not from nonparticipating owners. 142
PPM’s project faced strong opposition in public comments, so the
Fayette County Zoning Board denied PPM’s requests completely. 143
PPM appealed this to the Court of Common Pleas, and the judge in that
first case remanded to the Zoning Board with directions to consider and
grant the special exceptions, imposing any additional requirements
needed to address health, safety, and welfare concerns. 144
The Fayette County Zoning Board first sought clarification from
the judge, and then granted some of the variances, but refused to grant
others, including the setbacks between participating property owners.145
PPM again appealed, and the case was randomly assigned to a second
judge. 146
The standard of review was that Zoning Board decisions could only
be overturned for an abuse of discretion or an error of law. 147 Even with
this narrow standard, the second judge granted PPM’s appeal, noting
that there was no reasonable basis to deny an exception based on
setbacks to property lines, especially when all the property owners
consented to the project. 148 Because of the time delays, the court decided
it “would be a deprivation of due process to remand the case” again, and
therefore directly modified the Zoning Board resolution. 149
Significantly, the second judge noted the complexity of regulating
wind development and the particular challenges presented by local
siting. 150 As the judge noted, it is especially difficult when local
governments lack the necessary resources and expertise:
Unfortunately, just like a new prescription drug, new power
technologies can have unpleasant and unforeseen “side-effects.” And
both the federal and state governments acknowledge candidly that
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id. at 461.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 463–64.
Id. at 464–65.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 494.
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there are many as yet unanswered questions as to the best practices
for siting and operating wind-power “farms.” . . . Because of these
questions, local zoning governing bodies, and their appointed zoning
hearing boards, lack the information that would allow them to make
ideal decisions about location and operational conditions for wind
power facilities. 151

The PPM Atlantic Project highlights that even where wind specific
zoning ordinances are in place, local regulation can prove challenging
for developers in several ways:
First, the third township had its own zoning laws related to wind
development. 152 So even if the Fayette County process had been
smoother, PPM still had to absorb the added cost of going through an
additional separate approval.
Second, this case shows how broad discretion on the part of a local
government, even where wind specific provisions exist, can allow for
unforeseeable and arbitrary decisions.
Third, this case illustrates the costly delay caused by varying local
controls. PPM first started work on this wind development in 2007, and
although the project was constructed in 2010, litigation over the wind
farm continued through 2014. 153 Heavy litigation and additional costs
are deterrents to any investors regardless of their zeal in promoting what
the PPM court called “clean renewable ‘green’ electric energy.” 154
4.

Lack of Predictability

Plaxton v. Lycoming County Zoning Hearing Board 155: Laurel Hill
Wind Energy L.L.C. faced a dizzying seesaw of decisions in developing a
project in Lycoming County before it was finally completed in 2012.
Seven years before, in 2005, Laurel Hill applied for a special use permit
from the Lycoming County Hearing Board. 156 Laurel Hill wanted to
construct forty-seven wind turbines along a ridgeline between two
townships. 157 Although the county lacked wind specific provisions
Id. at 466–67 (emphasis added).
Id. at 461–62.
153 Id. at 467; see also PPM Atl. Renewable v. Fayette Cty. Zoning Hearing Bd., No. 1431
C.D. 2010, 2014 WL 2156744 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014); South Chestnut Wind Project, AVANGRID
RENEWABLES, http://www.avangridrenewables.us/cs_southchestnut.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2017).
154 Id. at 466.
155 986 A.2d 199, 202–03 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (referencing the earlier denial by the
county board and the unsuccessful appeal by Laurel Hill Wind L.L.C.).
156 Id. at 202.
157 Id.
151
152
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within its zoning laws, the county board held that the project was
entitled to a special use permit, as it was a “public service use.” 158
Regardless of this seemingly positive designation, the county board
rejected the Laurel Hill project, determining that it would result in
adverse impacts to the environment and to community health and
welfare. 159
Laurel Hill appealed this decision to the courts, but the board’s
decision was upheld. 160 Following its first rejection of Laurel Hill’s
project, however, the Lycoming County commissioners drafted an
ordinance that now permitted wind energy facilities, by right, within
certain zoning districts. 161 As a result, the ordinance changed the local
standards allowing the Laurel Hill project to move forward. 162
Local residents challenged the validity of the ordinance. 163 The
challenge to the ordinance claimed that it was an arbitrary and
capricious decision on the part of Lycoming County to draft specific
legislation to approve a project that had previously been rejected due to
adverse effects on public health and welfare. 164
However, as noted in previous Sections above, a reviewing court
can only overturn a board decision for abuse of discretion or error. The
challengers were not able to meet this high burden of proof, and
ultimately the court upheld the ordinance, deferring to the judgment of
the board and stating that it was not contrary to the goals of the
county. 165
Opponents of the project filed a second lawsuit challenging the
board’s approval of the project and claiming that Laurel Hill’s
application did not contain information sufficient to grant the approval
of the project. 166 The second court also rejected this claim, holding that
the application was sufficient for the board to come to a decision, and
that the approval was in line with the newly enacted amendments to the
ordinance. 167

158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

2009).
167

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 204.
Id.
Piccolella v. Lycoming Cty. Zoning Hearing Bd., 984 A.2d 1046, 1049 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Id. at 1051–52.
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Summary

Regardless of their individual outcomes, what these cases highlight
is (1) the danger of trying to regulate wind projects under existing
regulatory schemes that lack wind-specific provisions, and (2) reliance
on local boards to interpret provisions incompatible with wind projects
creates an uncertainty for both developers and local governments.
In Pennsylvania, strong local authority with little state control or
guidance resulted in local regulation based on unclear, inappropriate, or
purely discretionary standards and requirements. While resolving
questions regarding the siting of wind projects is best left to state and
local elected officials, these cases, instead, show that courts are making
these decisions on a case-by-case basis. Court rulings on non-windspecific local provisions offer little in the way of precedent-setting law to
help resolve future conflicts. This aggravates what is already a
patchwork of local legislation and creates greater uncertainty for later
projects. The result of this inconsistency is an unpredictable process that
offers no security for developers seeking to initiate projects, or local
residents seeking to oppose them.
Other states that fall along the local end of the wind regulation
continuum also illustrate the problems with strong local regulation and
limited state oversight. In Massachusetts, large-scale projects 100 MW
or larger are regulated by a single state agency, but projects smaller than
100 MW are regulated by local governments with limited state
involvement. 168 In 2003, a building inspector in the City of Princeton,
Massachusetts approved a permit for the installation of two test wind
turbines on municipal land, but adjacent to a private property. 169 The
permit was granted in spite of the fact that the towers exceeded the
height restrictions in the local zoning laws. 170
The neighboring landowner challenged the decision in the state
land court. In defense of his decision, the building inspector claimed
that the towers constituted a “public building,” and that they also were
exempted from height restrictions much like towers or other fixtures
commonly carried above a roof. 171 The court, applying principles of
statutory construction to interpret vague and inappropriate statutory
168 See HOWARD BERNSTEIN ET AL., MASS. DIV. OF ENERGY RES., RENEWABLE ENERGY &
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION GUIDEBOOK 44 (2001), http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/pubinfo/guidebook.pdf [http://perma.cc/N6FU-6D8X] (discussing the consolidated review process
for large-scale energy facility projects of 100 MW and greater).
169 Bomba v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, No. 293552, 2005 WL 2106162, *2 (Mass. Land Ct. Sept.
1, 2005).
170 Id.
171 Id. at *5.
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provisions, ruled against the building inspector and invalidated the
permit. 172 The case highlights the complications of regulations that
allow discretionary approvals with no limitations or guidance specific to
wind projects.
III. YESS—YES EMPHASIS ON STATEWIDE SITING
The cases in the previous Part illustrate many of the problems with
relying on the default option of leaving wind siting regulation to local
authorities. If wind development is new to an area, local officials may
not have enacted any wind-specific ordinances and lack the resources
and expertise to do so effectively. Wind development is distinct from
conventional electricity generation facilities in that it is more likely to
cross jurisdictional boundaries. 173 This creates increased pressure on
devising a regulatory structure that can respond to the more regional
nature of projects that have spillover effects, and benefits. Not least of
these benefits is the role of wind power in meeting state, national, and
world goals for addressing climate change through alternative noncarbon-producing sources of energy.
This Part again focuses on case law to illustrate the advantages and
disadvantages of four models for statewide siting regimes for wind
development. The criteria used to evaluate each include efficiency and
predictability of wind siting regulation along with methods for
incorporating local input in a balanced way that can counteract
arbitrary NIMBY results.

Id. at *7–8.
Conventional power plants addressed similar questions in the 1970s, when concern over
public health and environmental impacts conflicted with a growing demand for new power
generation. The result was a complex regulatory process involving multiple state and federal
agencies. In response to these complications, several states granted a single state-wide agency
the authority for siting decisions. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin all have state agencies that determine siting,
although many still balance state and local interests that can give local governments significant
control over siting determinations. See Outka, Footprint, supra note 39, at 257–59 for a review
of state approaches to siting conventional power plants. See also A. Dan Tarlock et al.,
Environmental Regulation of Power Plant Siting: Existing and Proposed Institutions, 45 S. CAL.
L. REV. 502 (1972) (considering the environmental impacts of non-centralized siting); Mason
Willrich, The Energy-Environment Conflict: Siting Electric Power Facilities, 58 VA. L. REV. 257
(1972) (looking at how increased demand, environmental considerations, and public health are
hindered by complex decentralized reviews).
172
173
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The Wisconsin Approach—Statewide Regulation, Local
Administration

In Wisconsin, the state has opted for an approach that focuses the
regulatory power with the state, relying on technical experts to create
clear and consistent standards that all large-scale wind farms must meet
regardless of jurisdiction. However, while the state creates the
regulations and the standards, it delegates review and approvals to local
governments, allowing them the final say as to whether a proponent has
met those requirements.
Under the Wisconsin Renewable Energy Act, the Wisconsin State
Power Commission (WSPC) has the authority to promulgate rules, and
does so consulting with an advisory board called the Wind Siting
Council. 174 Under the broad utility-siting powers of the Renewable
Energy Act, the WSPC is authorized to draft rules regarding setbacks,
noise levels, aesthetics, shadow flicker, decommissioning requirements,
and interference with radio and television signals. The WSPC is also
charged with setting standards for the types and amount of
documentation required for approval. 175
While the WSPC retains the authority to set regulations and
standards that all utility scale wind developments must meet, it delegates
the administration of wind siting review and approvals to local
governments. 176 Therefore, while local approvals and local challenges
are considered and resolved by local governments, the standards and
conditions under consideration for these approvals are set by the WSPC.
The Wisconsin legislature and the WSPC, therefore, allow limited
local regulation of wind projects but heavily constrain when and how
local governments can restrict projects. Under the WSPC regulations,
local governments can set conditions for specific wind projects through
the grant of conditional use permits under their zoning authority. 177
174 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 15.797 (West 2012) (authorizing the creation of the Wind Siting
Council, an advisory board composed of: “(1) Two members representing wind energy system
developers. (2) One member representing towns and one member representing counties. (3)
Two members representing the energy industry. (4) Two members representing environmental
groups. (5) Two members representing realtors. (6) Two members who are landowners living
adjacent to or in the vicinity of a wind energy system and who have not received compensation
by or on behalf of owners, operators, or developers of wind energy systems. (7) Two public
members. (8) [And o]ne member who is a University of Wisconsin System faculty member
with expertise regarding the health impacts of wind energy systems.”); see also Wind Siting
Council, PUB. SERV. COMMISSION OF WIS., http://psc.wi.gov/renewables/windSitingCouncil.htm
(last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
175 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 196.378(4g)(b) (West 2014).
176 See id. § 66.0401 (West 2014).
177 Id. § 66.0401(1m); Zoning, LEAGUE OF WIS. MUNICIPALITIES, http://www.lwm-info.org/
719/Zoning (last visited Jan. 18, 2017).
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Under the regulations, local governments can only set restrictive
conditions on the approval of a wind project when: (1) it “[s]erves to
preserve or protect the public[’s] health or safety; (2) it “[d]oes not
significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly decrease its
efficiency”; or (3) it “[a]llows for an alternative system of comparable
cost and efficiency.” 178
Additionally, these conditions cannot be more restrictive than the
standards set by the WSPC and are subject to review by the
Commission. 179 One final restriction on locally imposed conditions is
that they must be set on a case-by-case basis and cannot create broad
prospective provisions changing the standards for all projects within a
jurisdiction. 180
By concentrating the regulatory authority with the WPSC,
Wisconsin’s approach limits the ability of local governments, which may
be unduly influenced by NIMBY interests, to set unreasonable standards
intended purely to prevent development. By granting a limited role for
local governments to set conditions on individual projects, Wisconsin
also attempts to allow for some legitimate restriction based on local
interests.
Two drawbacks of the Wisconsin approach are (1) crossjurisdictional reviews and (2) multiple appeals.
1.

Cross-Jurisdictional Reviews

A wind project in Wisconsin that crosses into two jurisdictions
would still be subject to review in both jurisdictions. 181 This can cause
problems when the developer meets the burden of one jurisdiction’s
restrictive conditions, but then encounters conflicting requirements
from another. 182
For example, in 2005, Forward Energy sought approval of a wind
energy development that spanned the Dodge and Fond du Lac counties
in Wisconsin. 183 Although Forward Energy had no problems with Fond
du Lac County, Dodge County, which had a wind ordinance, reviewed
the project and issued a conditional use permit with restrictive setbacks

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0401(1m).
Id.
180 This matter was reviewed by the courts and resolved in Ecker Brothers v. Calumet
County, 2009 WI App 112, ¶ 1, 321 Wis.2d 51, 55, 772 N.W.2d 240, 242.
181 See id.
182 Id.
183 In re Forward Energy L.L.C., 243 P.U.R.4th 297, 2005 WL 1712203 (Wis. P.S.C. July 14,
2005).
178
179
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aimed at aesthetic concerns and harms to wildlife species. 184 The
restrictions eliminated sixty turbines from the project whose siting was
designed to maximize wind efficiency. 185 Because these local restrictions
were more stringent than the state requirements, the Commission
reviewed them subject to section 66.0401. 186 After considering the
project’s potential impacts on public interests, the Board found that the
local restrictions met the public interest and upheld the setback
provisions of the conditional use permit. 187
2.

Multiple Appeals

Wisconsin’s approach also creates another potential hurdle for
development by creating the potential for two levels of review and
multiple opportunities for a project to be challenged. Developers or
challengers to a wind project can find themselves fighting not only over
the substantive concerns, but also over whether local governments have
the right to set conditions for certain projects. The conditions set by the
local governments vary across districts, which creates uncertain and
inconsistent outcomes.
For example, in Roberts v. Manitowoc County Board of Adjustment,
local residents challenged a county zoning board decision to grant a
conditional use permit for a proposed wind project. 188 The wind
developer, Navitas Energy, Inc., proposed a forty-nine turbine wind
project on private land. 189 Manitowoc County had a wind ordinance
that established setback distances consistent with state regulations. 190
The County granted Navitas a conditional use permit, under the proviso
that the conditions met one of the escape clause factors defined under
section 66.0401. 191 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, citing section
184 Id. The Dodge County Wind Energy Ordinance creates a wind energy overlay zoning
district, provides definitions for different sizes of wind projects, and creates provisions for
issuing a conditional use permit by the zoning board. See DODGE COUNTY, WIS., LAND USE
CODE ch. 4.11 (2012).
185 Forward Energy, 243 P.U.R.4th 297.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Roberts v. Manitowoc Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2006 WI App 169, ¶ 1, 295 Wis. 2d 522,
525, 721 N.W.2d 499, 500.
189 Id. ¶ 2.
190 Id. ¶ 13.
191 Id. ¶ 17. Although not specifically cited in the Manitowoc County Wind Ordinance, it
reiterated the same three conditions: 1) it “[s]erves to preserve or protect the public[’s] health
[and] safety,” 2) it “[d]oes not significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly
decrease its efficiency,” or 3) it “[a]llows for an alternative system of comparable cost and
efficiency.” Id.; see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0401 (West 2014).
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66.0401, recognized that the intent of the state statute was to promote
wind developments and that the local law allowing conditional use
permits was consistent with the state regulations. 192 It also upheld the
Board’s decision regarding the setbacks, holding that it was permissible
under the Wisconsin Renewable Energy Act because the local regulation
was not more restrictive than the state law and met the requirements for
local regulation. 193
Local conditions and restrictions are not always upheld, however.
In 2009, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals clarified that the power of local
government was restricted by state statute. This meant that local
governments were only authorized to set conditional restrictions; they
could not actually regulate wind projects in general. 194
For example, in Ecker Brothers v. Calumet County, local residents
seeking a wind development found themselves facing a county-wide ban
on wind development. 195 The Ecker Brothers filed for a declaratory
judgment that the ban violated the regulatory limitations on overly
restrictive local regulations, and that the County exceeded its authority
under section 66.0401. 196 The court, reading both the Wisconsin
Renewable Energy Act and the related statute limiting local authority,
recognized that the intent of the state legislation had been to promote
wind development, and not to restrict it. 197 The court further affirmed
that it was the intent of the state legislature to delegate to local
governments the administration of wind siting—involving the
application or interpretation of the law through permit review and
approvals—but not its regulation, including the creation of new
restrictions. 198 In short, local governments were only granted the
authority to approve projects based on the standards set by the state
through the WSPC and the Wisconsin Siting Council. 199 Calumet
County challenged this, arguing (a) that its ban met the requirements
for placing restrictions on wind development under section 66.0401,
and (b) that its ban was necessary to protect the public health and safety
Roberts, 2006 WI App 169, ¶ 17; see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0401.
Roberts, 2006 WI App 169, ¶ 18. Manitowoc County’s setback requirements were no
greater than those set by Public Service Commission regulation 128.13. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE
PSC § 128.13 (2016).
194 Ecker Bros. v. Calumet County, 2009 WI App 112, ¶ 23, 321 Wis. 2d 51, 67–68, 772
N.W.2d 240, 248.
195 Id. ¶ 2.
196 Id. The Ecker Brothers specifically referred to the restriction set by section 66.0401(1m)
that “[n]o political subdivision may place any restriction, either directly or in effect, on the
installation or use of a wind energy system that is more restrictive than the rules promulgated
by the commission under § 196.378 (4g)(b).” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0401(1m).
197 Ecker Bros., 2009 WI App 112, ¶¶ 19–22.
198 Id. ¶¶ 21–24.
199 Id.; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0401.
192
193
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of the local residents. 200 The court disagreed, holding that the escape
clause could only be used on a project-by-project basis through
conditional use permits. 201 It could not support blanket legislation that
affected all projects. 202
Although allowing local zoning boards to review and approve
projects will require some utility-scale wind developers to go through
multiple levels of review, Wisconsin’s limitations on local regulation
does ensure that reviews will be more uniform, and provides some
consistency and predictability to reviews. Allowing the state to set the
regulations and standards for wind projects eliminates the uncertainty
developers face with the discretionary power of local zoning boards,
particularly in jurisdictions that lack wind specific regulations. 203
By allowing local regulation under certain conditions, Wisconsin
has opened the door to those conditions being challenged. As the case
law indicates, the factors that allow local governments to set conditions
are not clearly defined. Although there may be value in retaining some
level of local control, local governments may not fully understand when
they have the power to impose restrictive conditions on a project, and
developers may be uncertain whether those conditions will be upheld by
the WPSC or whether they are challengeable in the courts. This
uncertainty not only creates potential legal hurdles for both developers
and opponents to wind projects, but also affects costs and the
consistency and predictability of the siting process.
B.

The Minnesota Approach—Statewide Preemption of Local
Regulation for “Good Cause”

Wisconsin’s division of authority between state and local
governments is unusual. In most states, the power to regulate and the
power to authorize projects lies with the same governing body.
Ecker Bros., 2009 WI App 112, ¶¶ 16–17.
Id. ¶¶ 12–24.
202 Id. ¶¶ 20–24. Oddly, the court used somewhat contrary reasoning in Emerging Energies,
L.L.P. v. Manitowoc County, No. 2008AP1508, 2009 WL 529910 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2009).
Decided several months before Ecker Brothers, the court of appeals in Emerging Energies ruled
that a facial challenge to a moratorium in Manitowoc County on conditional use permits for
wind farms was not ripe for adjudication until a permit was actually denied. Id. ¶¶ 11–13. The
court reasoned that until a project was proposed and under review, it was impossible to
determine if the moratorium would meet the requirements of section 66.0401’s escape clause.
Id.
203 However, it could be argued that continuing to allow local zoning boards to set
conditions for permit approvals in certain circumstances is more appropriate than allowing a
state agency to set conditions, as local boards will be more in touch and more familiar with
local interests.
200
201
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However, several states that have centralized the regulation, review, and
approval of wind projects with a single state-level agency or commission
continue to allow local governments to pass regulations impacting
proposed projects. One of the benefits of centralized state control of
utility-scale wind development is the consistency it creates. However,
dual regulation creates inherent problems as it opens the door for local
regulations that conflict with the state. In addition, projects that span
multiple jurisdictions also face conflicts between neighboring local
regulations. States that allow dual authority have generally created some
provision for how these conflicts will be resolved, allowing the state to
be the ultimate arbitrator when conflicts arise.
For example, Minnesota grants primary siting authority for large
wind energy conversion systems (LWECS) to the state Public Utility
Commission. 204 Like other states with centralized statewide authority,
the Public Utility Commission has the power to set standards and draft
regulations governing all aspects of a wind development including
setbacks, noise, environmental impacts, and all procedural
requirements. 205 Regardless of municipal boundaries, LWECS only
require a permit from the Public Utility Commission, which will
preempt any regional, county, or local regulation. 206
Like Wisconsin, the Minnesota statewide permit and regulations
supersede any local regulation. 207 However, Minnesota allows local
governments the authority to pass their own regulations and issue their
own conditional permits for wind projects. 208 Under section 216F.081, a
local government can not only adopt more stringent requirements than
the state, but the state must consider and apply those standards as part
of its review, unless the board finds that there is “good cause” not to. 209
204 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 216F.01–.05 (West 2010). Like many states, Minnesota divides
wind energy projects into two sizes. Wind projects smaller than 5 MW in nameplate capacity
are considered Small Wind Energy Conversion Systems (SWECS) and are governed by
municipal regulations. Wind projects larger than 5 MW are considered Large Wind Energy
Conversion Systems (LWECS) and are permitted by the state Public Energy Commission. See
id. § 216F.01.
205 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216F.05.
206 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216F.07.
207 Under Wisconsin’s statutory approach, no political subdivision of the state can place a
restriction on a wind project more restrictive than the state. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0401(1m)
(West 2014). In Minnesota, the state permit system for LWECS preempts any requirements set
by local, county, and special use governments. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216F.07.
208 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216F.08. Several local municipalities and counties have established
regulations for siting large-scale wind turbines. For example, the Town of Brainerd has a wind
ordinance that sets setback distances, maximum tower height, rotor lengths, and several other
provisions. BRAINERD, MINN., ZONING ORDINANCE § 34 (2009). The Chippewa County Wind
Energy Ordinance establishes setback distances, allows conditional noise provisions, and sets
decommissioning standards. CHIPPEWA COUNTY, MINN., ZONING ORDINANCE § 12 (2005).
209 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216F.081.
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The burden of proving good cause is on the Public Utility Commission.
This “good cause” provision gives the state discretion to resolve conflicts
by either choosing to ignore an overly burdensome local regulation, or
choosing which of any conflicting local regulations to apply.
The “good cause” provision under section 216F.081 was tested in
2012 in the case of In re AWA Goodhue Wind, L.L.C. 210 AWA proposed
to build a seventy-eight MW wind farm consisting of fifty towers in
Goodhue County. 211 This project was approved by the Minnesota Public
Utility Commission. 212
After the project had been proposed, Goodhue County passed a
local wind ordinance requiring a ten Rotor Diameter (RD) 213 setback
from every non-participating property 214 that did not give permission
for being within the setback. 215 The Minnesota Public Utility
Commission decided that the provisions of the County ordinance were
too burdensome and that there was good cause not to require AWA to
follow them under section 216F.081. 216
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reviewed the decision and agreed
(a) that the ten RD setback was unnecessary to protect human health,
safety, or quality of life, and (b) that the project, as approved by the
Commission, did not present any reasonable adverse health impacts. 217
Further the court agreed with the Commission that the Goodhue

210 In re AWA Goodhue Wind, L.L.C., No. A11-2229, 2012 WL 2369004 (Minn. Ct. App.
June 25, 2012).
211 Id. at *1.
212 Id.
213 The blade of a wind turbine is called a rotor. The measurement through the diameter of
the sweep of the blades is called the “Rotor Diameter.” DÉSIRÉ LE GOURIÉRÈS, WIND POWER
PLANTS: THEORY AND DESIGN 39 (1982). Rotor Diameter, along with tower height, is
sometimes used to calculate the required setbacks from neighboring properties, roads, or
schools. A ten RD setback is considerably larger than typical property line setbacks, which
typically fall around three RD. See Jonathan Rogers, Nathan Slegers & Mark Costello, A Method
for Defining Wind Setback Standards 3.2 (Dep’t of Mech. and Civil Eng’g, George Fox Univ.,
Faculty Paper No. 11, 2011), http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1004&context=mece_fac. Troy Rule surmised that a setback of even five RD would have a
significant impact on siting commercial wind development. Troy Rule, A Downwind View of
the Cathedral: Using Rule Four to Allocate Wind Rights, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207, 215 (2009).
214 Most states, including Minnesota, have not defined “non-participating property” within
their wind energy statutes. One exception is Wisconsin, who defines it under section 128.01 of
the Wisconsin Administrative Code as “real property that is not a participating property,” and a
“participating property” as one that hosts a turbine, or is subject to an agreement that provides
compensation or has waived any challenge of the project. WIS. ADMIN. CODE PSC § 128.01(8),
(13) (2016). In general, the term is used to define properties that have not become involved in
the project either as a turbine host, or as a non-host who has signed other agreements with the
developer; however, the term has not been defined within the Minnesota statute.
215 In re AWA, 2012 WL 2369004, at *1.
216 Id. at *3–4.
217 Id.
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County setback was designed to stop all impacts, not just adverse
impacts, and would not only preclude AWA’s proposed project, but
would severely hinder any future projects in the County and the overall
energy goals of the state. 218
By preempting local regulations and allowing the state to ignore
regulations for good cause, Minnesota’s approach to wind siting
eliminates the risk of NIMBY action from local governments such as
passing a blanket ban on wind development or creating regulations so
restrictive that they result in a de facto ban on wind development. The
Goodhue case shows that such restrictions resulting from a local
regulation are sufficient to meet the “good cause” standard set out by
state statute.
This approach, however, does not prevent some of the challenges
created by allowing local regulating and local permitting. Allowing local
permit approval places developers in the position of meeting at least two
sets of standards (both state and local) and perhaps more for projects
that span multiple jurisdictions. Local regulation also creates
uncertainty for developers who are unsure if a local provision will apply
until their project goes before the state Public Utilities Commission.
C.

The New York Approach—Statewide Preemption of Local
Regulation that Is “Unreasonably Burdensome”

In New York, Article X of the New York State Public Service Law is
similar to Minnesota in placing wind energy development under the
authority of a centralized state agency and allowing local permitting and
regulation. However, in New York, the state may ignore “unreasonably
burdensome” regulations. 219
However, one key difference between Article X in New York and
the controlling statute in Minnesota is which party has the burden to
prove that a local ordinance should not be applied. In Minnesota, the
burden lies with the state Public Utility Commission to show that there
is “good cause” to ignore a local regulation. 220 In New York, the burden
lies with the challenger to show that a local ordinance is not
“unreasonably burdensome.” 221
This small difference can be significant. Placing the burden on the
state utility commission, which has the knowledge and expertise to
support a claim, could represent a substantially lower burden than
218
219
220
221

Id.
N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 168(3)(e) (McKinney 2011).
In re AWA, 2012 WL 2369004, at *1.
N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 168(3)(e).
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placing it on the challenger, or the local government, which may lack
the substantial expertise, but also the resources, to gather sufficient
evidence to overcome the burden. 222
Article X was enacted in 1992, but had a sunset provision and was
allowed to expire in 2003. 223 The statute was reauthorized in 2011, but in
the interim all wind energy projects were authorized and regulated by
local governments. 224 At least three wind projects have initiated review
by the State Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment
under Article X since its reenactment in 2011, but none have yet been
approved under Article X. 225
However, in 2005, the court considered the “unreasonably
burdensome” condition of Article X for a fossil fuel power plant
proposed in Brooklyn, New York. 226 The proposed facility met the
requirements for approval with the New York State Board on Electric
Generation Siting and the Environment. 227 However, in an effort to stop
the project, Brooklyn initiated a condemnation process to secure the
property and halt construction. 228 The developer challenged Brooklyn’s
condemnation on several grounds, one of which was the state’s
authority under Article X, which restricted local laws that would impact

222 Particularly considering that most wind farms are sited in rural jurisdictions with smaller
populations, and may face tighter financial limitations.
223 E. Gail Suchman, N.Y. Power-Plant-Siting Laws: Efforts to Amend Article X Fail, N.Y. L.J.
(Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=900005488085/NY-PowerPlantSitingLaws-Efforts-to-Amend-Article-X-Fail?slreturn=20170118001258.
224 Large Wind Farm Developments, N.Y. ST. ENERGY RES. & DEV. AUTHORITY, https://
www.nyserda.ny.gov/Researchers-and-Policymakers/Power-Generation/Wind/Large-Wind
(last visited Jan. 18, 2017).
225 The Cassadaga Wind Project and the Lighthouse Wind Project are currently undergoing
the state review process. Cassadaga Wind L.L.C., No. ER15-2056-000, 150 FERC Rep. P 61182
(CCH) ¶ 61,182 (Mar. 11, 2015); An Assessment of Project Lighthouse Wind, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.) (Aug. 25, 2016, 12:30 A.M.), http://www.thedailynewsonline.com/article/20160825/
BDN06/160829037; T.J. Pignataro, Winds of Discontent Blow over Lake Ontario Towns Eyed for
Turbines, BUFFALO NEWS (July 30, 2016), http://buffalonews.com/2016/07/30/winds-ofdiscontent-blow-over-lake-ontario-towns-eyed-for-turbines; David Robinson, Cassadaga Wind
Project to Begin Year-Long Review, BUFFALO NEWS (Nov. 28, 2016), https://buffalonews.com/
2016/11/28/cassadaga-wind-project-begin-year-long-review. The Cape Vincent Wind Project,
funded by British Petroleum, was initiated in 2005, before the reenactment of Article X. The
project failed to get local approval due to a lack of consensus amongst the local residents, but,
with the return of Article X in 2011, continued through the state process. British Petroleum
finally withdrew its Article X application and canceled the project in 2014, citing the continued
disagreement between pro-wind and anti-wind members of the local community. Jaegun Lee,
BP “Terminating” Cape Vincent Wind Project, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES (Feb. 27, 2014, 12:36
AM), http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/article/20140227/NEWS03/702279838.
226 In re City of New York, No. 22246/05, 2005 WL 3442963, *1, 13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 14,
2005).
227 Id. at *2.
228 Id. at *3.

DUVIVIER.WITT.38.4.5 (Do Not Delete)

1490

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

4/13/2017 9:04 AM

[Vol. 38:1453

the siting of electrical generating facilities. 229 Brooklyn argued that the
facility was incompatible with its proposed development plan for the
neighborhood. 230
On appeal, the New York trial court, in considering whether to
uphold the local condemnation, looked to the legislative history of
Article X. 231 With this review, the court acknowledged the legislature’s
determination (1) that “there is a need for the state to control
determinations regarding the proposed siting of major steam electric
generating facilities within the State” 232 and (2) that the purpose of
Article X was to create a “one-stop certification statute” 233 “designed to
provide for the expeditious resolution of all matters concerning the
location of major steam electric generating facilities [within the State] in
a single proceeding.”234
The court went on to acknowledge that local governments had the
right to regulate, but that local governments had the burden of
supporting an ordinance if the state chose not to follow it. 235 The court
set a high bar for local governments seeking to overturn the state
board’s decisions to ignore local regulations, clearly favoring the state’s
discretion to approve or deny electrical generation facilities. 236
The approaches of Minnesota and New York open the door to
duplicative and possibly conflicting regulation, but both statutory
schemes offer an escape clause for the state authority to combat
NIMBYism that would unreasonably stonewall or reject a wind energy
project.
The different burdens for applying preemption suggest varying
degrees of state support for wind development. In Minnesota, placing
Id.
Id. at *2.
231 Id. at *10–11.
232 Id. at *10 (quoting N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1014 (McKinney 1972)).
233 Id. (quoting Governor’s Memorandum, 1978 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1838 (McKinney)).
234 Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. N.Y. State Bd. on Elec. Generation Siting & the Env’t, 197
A.D.2d 97, 101 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (alteration in original)).
235 Id. at *10 (quoting N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 168(2)(d) (repealed 2003)).
236 The court relied heavily on the opinions of the legislature and the governor to support its
perspective that Article X was intended to allow for a streamlined and centralized state process.
Id. (quoting the governor at the time of an earlier 1972 iteration of the law, Nelson Rockefeller,
who stated that “the establishment of a unified certificating procedure under the jurisdiction of
the new State Board [was to] replace the current uncoordinated welter of approvals, procedures
and agencies that have virtually paralyzed the construction of needed new power plants,” and
Governor Mario M. Cuomo, who approved Article X, who stated that the law was intended to
provide a “comprehensive review of the benefits and impacts anticipated from proposed
facilities without unreasonable delay” and that “one of the primary means by which the
Legislature sought to ensure the State’s control over siting decisions was in its grant of authority
to the Siting Board to waive municipal laws or regulations that could hinder the development of
electric generating facilities” Id. (citations omitted)).
229
230

DUVIVIER.WITT.38.4.5 (Do Not Delete)

4/13/2017 9:04 AM

NIMBY TO NOPE—OR YESS?

2017]

1491

the burden on the state to show “good cause” may increase the
likelihood that a local ordinance could withstand preemption. However,
the Goodhue case showed proving good cause is not an insurmountable
burden.
In New York, placing the burden on local governments to show
that their regulations are not unreasonably burdensome appears to show
strong support for state authority.
Both the Minnesota and New York approaches illustrate models
that help promote the development of wind energy through centralizing
and streamlining the approval process without completely silencing the
voice of local governments.
D.

The Ohio Approach—Superagency Authority

There are no states that place all of the regulatory and siting
authority for wind projects with a state agency, but Ohio comes the
closest. 237 Under Ohio law the state has the exclusive power to set
standards, promulgate regulations, and limit the means by which
projects can be challenged. 238
The benefits of a strong state authority, as we also saw with the
previous examples, is a streamlined process and uniform standards for
all wind projects across the state, providing a level of consistency that
can help encourage investment and promote development. Unlike the
previous examples, however, Ohio’s “one stop” or “superagency” regime
centralizes the entire process within a single agency. 239
Specifically, in Ohio, economically significant wind farms are
regulated through the Ohio Public Siting Board (OPSB), 240 and local
regulation is expressly preempted. 241 Thus, local governments cannot
237 Massachusetts also centralizes the review of wind projects in a single agency, but only for
projects larger than 100 MW. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §69G–69H (West 2003). No
such projects have ever been developed in Massachusetts, and their one-stop approach has
never been tested.
238 Ohio’s Statute section 4906 sets the process for siting “economically significant wind
farms,” defined as a system with an aggregate capacity between five MW and fifty MW. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.13(A) (West 2010). Systems larger than fifty MW are still governed
under the same approval, but are allowed using the minimum setback requirements. See
§ 4906.201(A).
239 About the OPSB, OHIO POWER SITING BOARD, https://www.opsb.ohio.gov/opsb/
index.cfm/About (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
240 Id.
241 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.13(B) (“No public agency or political subdivision of this
state may require any approval, consent, permit, certificate, or other condition for the
construction or initial operation of a major utility facility or economically significant wind farm
authorized by a certificate issued pursuant to Chapter 4906. [sic] of the Revised Code.”).
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institute bans or moratoriums, nor can they set their own regulations
regarding noise, aesthetic concerns, or environmental impacts.
Even with strong centralized authority to site and regulate wind
projects, Ohio has not, however, rendered local governments or their
citizens powerless. Exclusive state power, with no input by local
governments, would deny legitimate local concerns, so the OPSB has a
hearing process as one of the steps for wind farm permit approvals. 242
Local governments and members of the public have an opportunity to
comment and raise concerns about individual projects during this
hearing process, either by intervening as an actual party, or raising
comments as part of a public comment session. 243
In addition to commenting, local voices have the option of
recommending specific conditions for approval of a wind project. 244
However, the OPSB has the sole authority to approve or deny permits
for economically significant wind projects. 245 Therefore, any conditions
attached to permit approval suggested or recommended by local
governments as intervening parties are ultimately determined by the
OPSB.
Ohio’s strong “one-stop” state authority and wind specific
provisions have not completely eliminated legal challenges to wind
projects, but in contrast with litigation faced by projects in other states,
the legal battles over wind farms in Ohio have been less drawn out and
governed by a consistent and speedy review process. 246

242 Standard Application Process Flowchart, OHIO POWER SITING BOARD, https://www. opsb.
ohio.gov/opsb/?LinkServID=AFBB7552-C587-C103-CBF9480A93645E04 (last visited Jan. 19,
2017).
243 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4906.07–4906.09.
244 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.10(A).
245 Id.
246 According to anecdotal comments from developers, Ohio’s approach limits legal
challenges and promotes a more streamlined approval process on its face; but in practice,
developers have had difficulty with getting projects approved in the state, citing unfavorable
statewide regulations and a strong OPSB that disfavors wind development. Ohio’s anti-wind
policies are also reflected in the passage of Substitute Senate Bill 310 in 2014, which froze at
12.5% the progressive Ohio Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) that aimed for twenty-five
percent renewables by 2015. H. Pub. Util. Comm., Substitute. S.B. 310, 130th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2013–2014). This made Ohio the first state to roll back its RPS goals. That
same year, the state legislature passed increased setback provisions that made it more difficult
to efficiently site wind projects. See Tina Casey, Ohio to Wind Power: Drop Dead,
CLEANTECHNICA (June 17, 2014), https://cleantechnica.com/2014/06/17/ohio-wind-powertakes-lethal-blow-from-gov-kasich; see also Kathiann M. Kowalski, Industry: Setback Changes
Will End New Wind Farms in Ohio, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (June 19, 2014), http://
midwestenergynews.com/2014/06/19/industry-setback-changes-will-end-new-wind-farms-inohio. Anti-wind sentiment at the state level and a strong state agency highlight a potential issue
with superagency approaches: What happens when the superagency itself is opposed to the type
of development it is authorized to regulate?
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Black Fork Wind

In In re Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., several parties challenged
the OPSB’s approval of a wind project that spanned two adjacent
counties. 247 The wind project, proposed by Black Fork Wind Energy,
L.L.C. in 2011, consisted of ninety-one turbines in portions of Crawford
and Richland Counties. 248 The nameplate capacity of the project was up
to 200 MW, placing it within the siting authority of the OPSB. 249
A litany of substantive challenges were raised at the public hearing
before an administrative law judge, including potential impacts to
health and safety, aesthetics and noise, public welfare, and the
environment. 250 All of these issues were presented, considered, and
resolved at the OPSB hearing. As a result of the public input during the
hearing process, the OPSB granted the wind permit subject to eighty
conditions. 251
Some of the challengers remained resistant to the development
even though the OPSB adopted all of the eighty requested conditions. 252
These challengers continued to fight the approval first by requesting a
rehearing before the OPSB, which was denied, 253 and then appealing
directly to the Ohio Supreme Court, which has “‘complete and
independent power of review as to all questions of law’ in appeals from
the [OPSB].” 254

247

at ¶ 1.

In re Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 138 Ohio St. 3d 43, 2013-Ohio-5478, 3 N.E.3d 173,

248 In re Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., No. 10-2865-EL-BGN, 2012 WL 344874, *1 (Ohio
Pub. Siting Bd. Jan. 23, 2012).
249 Id.
250 At the public hearing, thirteen witnesses testified in favor of the project, and twelve
testified against it. Id. Opponents raised issues of noise, shadow flicker, ice throw, loss of
viewshed, and negative impacts to property values, public health, wildlife, telephone, television,
and internet reception, water, and the overall environment. Id. Other opponents also raised
claims that the developer had engaged in harassing behavior towards local property owners. Id.
The determination of the Board outlining the issues raised and resolved at the public hearing,
and the Board’s final determination are outlined in In re Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 2012
WL 344874.
251 Id. The OPSB has the authority to grant permits subject to “such terms, conditions, or
modifications of the construction, operation, or maintenance of the major utility facility as the
board considers appropriate.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.10 (West 2010). The challengers,
the board, and the applicant initially stipulated to seventy-one different conditions for
approving the permit, and later amended the stipulation to add nine conditions. See In re Black
Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 2012 WL 344874. As part of their approval, the board adopted all
eighty conditions requested under the stipulations. Id.
252 In re Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 138 Ohio St. 3d at ¶ 9.
253 Id.
254 Id. at ¶ 10 (quoting Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 121 Ohio St. 3d
362, 2009-Ohio-604, 904 N.E.2d 853, at ¶ 13).
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According to Ohio law, the standard of review applied by the Ohio
Supreme Court to appeals from the OPSB is that the order “shall be
reversed, vacated, or modified . . . only when . . . the court finds the
order to be unlawful or unreasonable.” 255 The Ohio Supreme Court
affirmed the OPSB, holding that the challengers had waived their right
to cross-examine certain witnesses, and thus, their due process rights
had not been violated. 256
2.

Buckeye Wind

In another case, In re Buckeye Wind, L.L.C., several interests
challenged the state board approval of a seventy turbine, 126 MW
capacity wind farm in Champaign County. 257 The project went through
a public hearing before the OPSB, and, as in Black Fork, challengers to
the project were allowed to present evidence and argue against the
project’s approval. 258
Ultimately, the OPSB approved the Buckeye Wind project subject
to seventy different permit conditions. 259 However, the OPSB rejected
some requested conditions, most notably a bonding requirement
proposed by some of the challengers. 260
Project opponents appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, claiming
that the hearing procedure was insufficient and that the board
improperly delegated its decision to Board staff. 261
The Ohio Supreme Court split four to three with the majority
upholding the OPSB decision, again citing the high “unlawful or
unreasonable” standard for reversing any such decision. 262 Three
dissenting justices believed that the process, which included some nonpublic proceedings, 263 had “denied the citizens affected . . . their only
opportunity to be heard,” 264 with one dissenter especially concerned
about the bonding issue. 265
Id. (emphasis added) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4906.12, 4903.12).
Id. at ¶¶ 23–24.
257 In re Buckeye Wind, L.L.C., 131 Ohio St. 3d 449, 2012-Ohio-878, 966 N.E.2d 869, at ¶ 3.
258 In re Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 138 Ohio St. 3d at ¶ 8; In re Buckeye Wind, L.L.C.,
131 Ohio St. 3d at ¶¶ 4–5.
259 In re Buckeye Wind, L.L.C., 131 Ohio St. 3d at ¶ 17.
260 Id. ¶ 6.
261 Id. ¶ 7.
262 Id. ¶ 26.
263 Id. ¶¶ 63–65 (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.10).
264 Id. ¶¶ 47–48.
265 Id. ¶ 39 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). This dissent appeared skeptical of wind power generally:
“How many windmills does it take to power a light bulb? As many as the government will
subsidize. It may not be geographically preposterous to build windmills in Ohio—not like
255
256
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Although it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from the limited
case law available, Ohio’s process appears to be the most successful at
restricting local authority to deny projects or set overly burdensome
conditions intended to frustrate development. 266 Here are some of its
advantages:
1) The Ohio superagency approach creates consistency:
Utility scale wind projects across the state will face one
review before the OPSB, with defined wind-specific
standards. 267
2) Substantive challenges are handled before the Board itself,
which has the benefit of having technical expertise to
understand the unique impacts that wind projects create
and the benefits they provide.
3) Despite this strong statewide control, the process allows
local interests a voice in the siting and approval process.
Local challenges to projects on substantive grounds are
limited to the public hearing before the OPSB, however, the
public hearing process allows challengers the ability to
introduce witnesses, present evidence, and have a voice in
what conditions are included with a permit approval.
4) The examples presented by the Buckeye Wind and Black
Fork approvals suggest that the Board is not only open to
conditions based on local concerns, but are supportive of
them, accepting most conditions proposed by challengers.
5) Projects that cross jurisdictional lines will not face multiple
review processes, at least for siting approval. With the
participation of local governments and neighboring
property owners during the hearing process, the OPSB is
also best positioned to avoid, minimize, or mitigate the
impacts to local communities while also considering the
broader common good.

building a solar energy farm in Upper Sandusky—since we do have wind. But for how long will
government be willing to subsidize a form of energy production that is uneconomical and
undependable? The mechanical obsolescence of windmills is one matter of concern; that is,
what will become of these whopping, white whirligigs when they become technologically
outmoded even in comparison to other windmills?” Id. ¶ 40.
266 Since the original draft of this paper, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the OPSB’s
approval of another wind energy development in Champaign County. See In re Champaign
Wind, L.L.C., 146 Ohio St. 3d 489, 2016-Ohio-1513, 58 N.E.3d 1142. The court followed similar
reasoning to its decision in Buckeye Wind, upholding the procedural decisions of the board and
giving deference to the board’s substantive decisions. Id.
267 Most utility-scale wind projects will exceed Ohio’s five MW threshold for statewide
regulation.
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6) The expedited Ohio review process—directly from the
OPSB or the PUC to the Ohio Supreme Court—
considerably shortens the time for a final decision,
minimizing delay and uncertainty for projects. For
example, the time between the initial OPSB permit
decisions in both Black Fork and Buckeye Wind and the
Ohio Supreme Court’s decisions on appeal was less than
two years. 268
7) The high standard of review applied to OPSB decisions
places strong reliance on the agency and creates greater
certainty in their reliability.
IV. A CASE STUDY OF HOW NIMBY CAN TURN TO NOPE
An emphasis on statewide siting has significant benefits. The lack
of strong state involvement in wind regulation and wind siting can pose
sometimes insurmountable challenges to wind development, and the
states that have adopted some degree of statewide authority show clear
advantages to centralization of authority with a state agency. The
different state-centered approaches described above show that limiting,
without eliminating, local authority can promote projects without
ignoring local concerns. This final Part will employ New York’s history
of wind energy regulation as a case study for how purely local regulation
can not only promote NIMBYism, but also result in NOPE outcomes.
A.

New York Wind Siting Regulation

New York has gone through dramatic changes in its regulatory
approach to utility siting over the past thirty years, alternating between
approaches that employ strong state authorization at some times and, at
other times, almost total delegation to local authorities. 269
Prior to 2003, the siting of large-scale utility projects in New York
was reviewed and approved by the New York State Board on Electric
Generation Siting and the Environment under Article X of the New
York State Public Service Law. 270 Article X gave the State Board the final
say on all power generation projects greater than eighty MW in
268 See In re Black Fork Wind Energy, L.L.C., 138 Ohio St. 3d 43, 2013-Ohio-5478, 3 N.E.3d
173; In re Buckeye Wind, L.L.C., 131 Ohio St. 3d 449.
269 See Gregory D. Eriksen, Note, Breaking Wind, Fixing Wind: Facilitating Wind Energy
Development in New York State, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 189 (2009).
270 See id. at 193.

DUVIVIER.WITT.38.4.5 (Do Not Delete)

2017]

NIMBY TO NOPE—OR YESS?

4/13/2017 9:04 AM

1497

capacity. 271 Article X also established regulations for addressing
environmental impacts, as well as a hearing process for local
governments and residents to challenge the final decisions by the
Board. 272 The New York legislature allowed Article X to expire in 2003
due to financial concerns following the collapse of Enron and due to
increased pressure from environmental groups. 273 Without Article X,
the authority for siting large-scale energy projects defaulted back to local
governments. 274
In the early 2000s, New York saw a surge of new wind
development. 275 With Article X no longer in effect, local governments
moved to pass legislation to regulate the rapidly growing wind energy
industry. What resulted was a series of legal challenges that stymied
wind projects across the state. 276
With siting decisions falling under local control, municipalities
became the lead agencies for these reviews. The details of these cases
varied greatly, but generally involved procedural challenges to local
zoning board decisions to approve wind projects. 277 One common
271 See Nicholas Faso & Terresa Bakner, The Return to Article X: A New Paradigm for
Approving Energy Projects in New York State, N.Y. ZONING L. & PRACTICE REP., Sept.–Oct. 2011
(citing 1992 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1478, 1479-80).
272 Article X was enacted in 1992 and replaced an earlier statute, Article VIII, which was
enacted in 1972. Article VIII had a lengthier hearing process, lacked some of the environmental
regulations, and had more limits on the input of local governments than Article X. Article X
was intended to both streamline the review process, but also to take into account an increased
understanding of the environmental impacts caused by large-scale energy projects. Id.
273 Suchman, supra note 223.
274 Large Wind Farm Developments, N.Y. ST. ENERGY RES. & DEV. AUTHORITY, http://
www.nyserda.ny.gov/Cleantech-and-Innovation/Power-Generation/Wind/Large-Wind
(last
visited Jan. 4, 2017); see also Eriksen, supra note 269, at 193–95.
275 In 2000, New York had fifteen MW of installed wind capacity. By 2009, the installed wind
capacity had increased to 1,274 MW. Eric Garofano, Note, Losing Power: Siting Power Plants in
New York State, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 728, 746 (2011).
276 Many of these challenges to State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) decisions,
which required municipalities to address environmental impacts of development projects, were
brought under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules (NYCPLR). See N.Y.
ENVITL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 2005). For a detailed discussion of
SEQRA decisions challenged under Article 78 of the NYCPLR, see Eriksen, supra note 269, at
196, 198–201.
277 Eriksen offers a detailed discussion of some of the legal challenges to wind projects in
New York, citing In re Trude v. Town Board of Cohocton, No. 95,747, 2007 WL 2811372 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Sept. 24, 2007) (local residents unsuccessfully challenged a local wind regulation
claiming its noise and setback provisions failed to meet SEQRA requirements and did not
comply with the comprehensive plan’s goals to maintain the “rural character” of the
community); In re Brander v. Town of Warren Town Bd., 847 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 2007)
(residents successfully challenged zoning board approval of a project for failing to consider
alternatives as required under SEQRA); In re Friedhaber v. Town Bd. of Sheldon, 59 A.D.3d
1006 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (unsuccessful procedural challenge to a zoning board approval to
grant variances for a wind development project); In re West Beekmantown Neighborhood Ass’n
v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Beekmantown, 53 A.D.3d 954, 955 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
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thread in these cases is that local municipalities made the challenged
decisions, and these decisions were often the result of shoehorning wind
projects into zoning regulations that contained no wind-specific
provisions.
This highlights some of the problems with the default option—so
prevalent across the country—of giving local governments the authority
to make siting decisions. Zoning regulations that lack wind-specific
provisions may not adequately cover the types of concerns and impacts
wind projects present given the unique impacts that wind energy
projects create. 278 Additionally, local governments may lack the
technical expertise to properly regulate or review wind projects, failing
to understand the nature of the impacts or how siting decisions may
affect the efficiency of a project. 279 Additionally, local review boards may
also be unfairly influenced by strong local interests in favor of, or
opposed to, a project, and fail to give projects an unbiased review that
takes into consideration statewide or regional energy needs.
Another problem raised with granting unrestricted authority over
wind energy development is that large scale projects crossing
jurisdictional boundaries are likely to encounter differing, or even
conflicting, regulatory requirements and conflicting opinions regarding
wind energy projects among different authorizing bodies 280 or review
courts. 281 Duplicate or conflicting regulations not only run the risk of
discouraging wind energy development, but also provide no sure
guarantee that local interests will be protected.

(unsuccessful challenge of a wind project approved by a local zoning board, claiming that the
board incorrectly defined a wind project as an “essential service”); see also Eriksen, supra note
269, at 198–200.
278 See generally Tioga Pres. Grp. v. Tioga Cty. Planning Comm’n, 970 A.2d 1200, 1202 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2009); discussion supra Section II.C.
279 See generally PPM Atl. Renewable v. Fayette Cty. Hearing Bd., 13 Pa. D. & C.5th 458 (Pa.
Ct. C.P. 2010); discussion supra Section II.C.
280 See generally PPM Atl. Renewable v. Fayette Cty. Hearing Bd., 13 Pa. D. & C.5th 458 (Pa.
Ct. C.P. 2010); discussion supra Section II.C.
281 Contrast the language of Judge Pfeifer’s dissent in In Re Buckeye Wind, L.L.C., 131 Ohio
St. 3d 449, 2012-Ohio-878, 966 N.E.2d 869, 878–79, at ¶¶ 40–43 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting), with the
supportive language about renewable energy development in Judge Leskinen’s opinion in PPM
Atlantic Renewable, 13 Pa. D. & C.5th at 466 (“While windmills have been around for centuries,
wind turbines as a source of clean renewable ‘green’ electric energy have recently become
heavily emphasized as one of the best ways to reduce our collective dependence on more
established technologies dependent on fossil fuels.”).
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The Ecogen Saga

Perhaps no series of cases better highlights the legal challenges
posed by local control of wind turbine siting than a proposal to develop
a wind energy project in Western New York by Ecogen, L.L.C. Ecogen’s
efforts have spanned almost fifteen years and resulted in ongoing
litigation with no fewer than ten reported decisions. 282 As a result, the
project has still not been built.
In 2001, Ecogen began investigating the development of a wind
energy project in two adjacent New York counties. 283 Over ninety-nine
different site locations were considered, but ultimately, Ecogen settled
on a layout that placed fifty-three turbines in Steuben County within the
Town of Prattsburgh. 284 In addition, Ecogen planned to build an
electrical substation in the neighboring Town of Italy, located in Yates
County. 285 Because Article X had expired at the time the project was
initiated, the siting authority rested with the local governments, and
therefore the project required approval of both the Town of Prattsburgh
in Steuben County and the Town of Italy in Yates County.
The zoning board in Prattsburgh was initially supportive of the
project. In 2009, it ruled that the project could move forward with no
further approval from the board. 286
Support for the project in the Town of Italy was not as strong even
though neighboring Prattsburgh had given Ecogen a green light. In an
effort to halt the project, the Town of Italy passed a moratorium on all
wind development within its borders. 287 The Town of Italy extended the

282 For opinions related to the Town of Italy challenges, see Ecogen, L.L.C. v. Town of Italy,
461 F. Supp. 2d 100 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); Ecogen, L.L.C. v. Town of Italy, 438 F. Supp. 2d 149
(W.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Ecogen Wind, L.L.C. v. Town of Italy Town Board, 106 A.D.3d 1457
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013); Finger Lakes Preservation Association v. Town Board of Italy, 887
N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 2009). For opinions related to the Steuben County challenges, see In re
Ecogen Wind, L.L.C. v. Town of Prattsburgh Town Board, 112 A.D.3d 1282 (N.Y. App. Div.
2013); In re Advocates for Prattsburgh, Inc. v. Steuben County Indus. Development Agency, 48
A.D.3d 1160 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); In re Advocates for Prattsburgh, Inc. v. Steuben County
Industry Development Agency, 48 A.D.3d 1157 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); In re Advocates for
Prattsburgh, Inc. v. Steuben County Industry Development Agency, No. 06/04099, 2007 WL
4877911 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 5, 2007); Advocates for Prattsburgh, Inc. v. Steuben County Industry
Development Agency, 35 A.D.3d 1292 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Advocates for Prattsburgh,
Inc. v. Steuben County Industry Development Agency, No. 06/04099, 2006 WL 5110569 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 19, 2006).
283 Ecogen, L.L.C., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
284 In re Advocates for Prattsburgh, Inc., 2007 WL 4877911, at *2.
285 Ecogen, L.L.C., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 151.
286 Ecogen Wind, L.L.C., 112 A.D.3d at 1283–84.
287 Ecogen, L.L.C., 438 F. Supp. 2d 149.
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moratorium several times, to the point that Ecogen decided that the
Town would never allow the project to move forward. 288
In response to the moratorium, Ecogen filed suit against the Town
of Italy in 2006, claiming that the Town lacked the authority to pass the
moratorium and that it was unreasonably long. 289 The court did not
overturn the moratorium, but required the Town of Italy to develop the
necessary regulations for approving the project within ninety days. 290
Unfortunately for Ecogen, this small victory did little to advance
the project. While Ecogen’s project was held up by Italy’s moratorium
and the subsequent lawsuit, there were significant changes to the zoning
board in the Town of Prattsburgh. This newly-elected zoning board in
the Town of Prattsburgh now opposed the Ecogen project. 291
Ecogen’s project in Italy and Prattsburgh is a case study for how
local NIMBY regulation can lead to NOPE results, especially when
projects cross jurisdictional lines. Unlike conventional fossil-fuel
generation power plants, wind development is more likely to cross
jurisdictional lines given the extensive acreages required for large-scale
wind energy projects. This means that wind projects, which are more
likely to cross jurisdictional lines, are especially vulnerable to the
vagaries of differing local regulations. States that lack some sort of
statewide siting regime for wind siting run the risk of allowing
conflicting municipal requirements or conflicting local interests either
to hold up proposed wind developments, to create additional
complications and costs through differing regulations across borders, or
to halt development entirely.
In 2011, Governor Andrew Cuomo signed into law the Power Act
of 2011. 292 The Act included a provision that reauthorized and updated
Article X of the Public Service Law. 293 The reenactment of Article X
returned the exclusive authority to site large-scale utility projects to the
State Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment. 294 In
addition, the Public Service Law expanded the reach of state authority
by decreasing the threshold for projects requiring state approval down
to a nameplate capacity of twenty-five MW. 295 Unlike the 1992 version,
Id. at 153.
Id. at 153–54.
290 Id. at 163.
291 In re Ecogen Wind, L.L.C., 112 A.D.3d at 1283–84.
292 Power Act of 2011, S. 5844, S. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011); Faso & Bakner, supra
note 271.
293 Faso & Bakner, supra note 271.
294 N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 168 (McKinney 2011).
295 N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGS, tit. 16, § 1000.2(v) (2017) (defining a “Major Electric
Generating Facility” as “[a]n electric generating facility with a nameplate generating capacity of
twenty-five megawatts or more”).
288
289
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the updated law included some specific requirements for wind-powered
facilities. 296
Article X now granted the State Board the exclusive authority to
preempt other state or local laws that might conflict with siting
decisions if the board found them to be “unreasonably burdensome.”297
A local government is allowed to challenge the decision of the state
board and force the state to apply the local law, but the local
government also carries the burden of showing that the local law or
regulation is not unreasonably burdensome. 298
Article X would have dramatically changed the circumstances
Ecogen Wind, L.L.C. faced in the Towns of Prattsburgh and Italy by
removing the complications of different municipalities imposing
different restrictions or independently challenging portions of the
projects. The local governments and residents would still have the
ability to challenge the development through the hearing before the
State Board, but Ecogen would now face a single approval process
through a centralized authority that also has the power to overrule any
local regulations that are holding up the project. The efficiency of a
centralized process thus presents a more streamlined and predictable
approach, decreasing the uncertainty of patchwork local regulation.
C.

Shift to Statewide Siting

The impact that New York’s Article X has had on the development
of, and legal challenges to, large-scale energy development is visible
largely in the difficulties that its absence created. The Ecogen battles
occurred in the gap from Article X’s expiration in 2003 and its
reenactment in 2011. Although no wind development projects have
been challenged under either iteration of Article X, 299 examples from
other New York projects provide insight into its benefits.
In In re City of New York, TransGas initiated the acquisition of a
property for the construction of an electric generating plant in
Brooklyn, New York. 300 Article X applied because the project was
initiated before the Article’s expiration in 2003. Brooklyn planned to

296 The new version requires studies to evaluate impacts to bat and avian species as well as
impacts to human health. Faso & Bakner, supra note 271.
297 PUB. SERV. § 168(3)(e); Faso & Bakner, supra note 271.
298 See id.
299 At least three wind projects have initiated review by the State Board on Electric
Generation Siting and the Environment under Article X since its reenactment in 2011. See
supra note 225.
300 In re City of New York, No. 22246/05, 2005 WL 3442963, *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 2005).
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develop part of the project area as a park. 301 The developers agreed to
alter their plans to be more compatible with Brooklyn’s interests, and
even offered to fund part of the park construction. 302 However,
Brooklyn still fought the project and proposed their acquisition of the
proposed parcel of land under eminent domain.
TransGas sought relief from the courts, declaring in part that the
condemnation of the property violated Article X. 303 Relying heavily on
the stated purpose of Article X, as expressed by the state legislature and
the Governor, 304 the court set a high bar for Brooklyn. The court noted
that the intent of Article X was to create a streamlined process to
promote the construction of power generative facilities and that local
governments had the burden to prove laws or regulations were not
“unreasonably restrictive.” 305 Brooklyn was allowed to present evidence
during the hearing to show that its local action was not unreasonably
restrictive. 306 Ultimately, the court determined that “the City’s
proceeding to condemn the Site is intended to circumvent the Siting
Board’s jurisdiction” and that “[s]uch a result cannot be permitted.” 307
The court in In Re City of New York was applying the 1992 version
of Article X, but the 2011 version of the law contains similar provisions,
placing siting authority squarely under the authority of the State
Board. 308 The Article X statewide siting regime gives the State Board
strong deference in deciding whether to apply local regulations and
places the burden on local governments to show why their regulations
are not unreasonably burdensome. 309
This represents a substantial change in the siting process that
hindered Ecogen’s development in the Towns of Italy and Prattsburgh.
Under Article X, local governments would be unable to block projects
by passing bans or moratoriums, and the decision to approve or deny a
project would lie squarely with the state agency. Furthermore, under
Article X, New York shifted from a locally-driven regulatory scheme—
which resulted in numerous legal battles and regulatory uncertainty—to
a more state-centered approach. Despite the shift, the Article X process

Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
303 Id. at *3.
304 Id. at *10.
305 Id. at *10–11.
306 Id. at *10.
307 Id. at *13.
308 The sunset provision expired for the 1992 iteration of Article X in 2003. It was not
renewed and revised until 2011. This case was decided in 2005, discussing events that occurred
prior to the 2003 expiration. See supra note 272.
309 N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 168(3)(e) (McKinney 2011).
301
302
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still continues to provide a voice for local governments without allowing
local opposition and NIMBYism to lead to NOPE results. 310.
CONCLUSION
The conclusions of this Article are based upon three assumptions.
First is the assumption that litigation is a good barometer for the
effectiveness of wind siting regulations. The limited case law identified
while researching this Article may be a positive thing; it may indicate
that most wind energy projects are approved by state agencies or local
governments with few legal challenges. However, the examples of
protracted litigation discussed in this Article illustrate that some
regimes for wind siting seem to be less effective than others due to the
delay and costs to all parties. As wind development increases
throughout the United States, the authors hope that areas with new
wind development can learn from the examples discussed here.
The second assumption is that wind power development plays a
significant role in meeting state, national, and global goals for
addressing climate change through alternative non-carbon-producing
sources of electricity generation. This review suggests that widely
varying local control of wind siting, which is currently the default in
most states, may significantly interfere with the nation’s efforts to
deploy these alternative renewable energy sources. Discretionary
authority scattered amongst counties, townships, and cities, allows
competing local interests to decide what wind projects are approved,
and which are rejected. Local regulators are more likely to focus on the
demands of their constituents with NIMBY motives. As the cases
discussed here show, these attitudes can not only add costs and delays to
projects, but can also completely prevent them from being developed—a
NOPE result.
Finally, the third assumption is that the best wind siting regimes
create a balance between predictable and timely wind power siting and
local concerns. One clear conclusion that can be drawn, particularly
looking at the stark contrast between states like Pennsylvania and Ohio,
is that attempting to regulate wind energy projects through existing
zoning regulations creates an uncertain regulatory environment open to
legal challenges that ask courts, and local governments, to interpret laws
310 What is unclear, due the lack of wind projects reviewed under Article X, is how well
legitimate local concerns are protected. The court’s ruling in In Re City of New York suggests
that the court has set a high burden for local governments restricting wind development.
However, in Ohio, the hearings before the OPSB do result in conditions that protect local
interests. See supra Section III.D.
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that simply do not apply to the projects they are seeking to regulate.
Furthermore, while local input on siting decisions is favorable to
address legitimate concerns, leaving sole discretion at the local level
empowers NIMBY interests and leads to communities saying NOPE to
wind altogether.
States that have recognized the need for a greater emphasis on
statewide siting often charge state agencies with regulating wind
development. These agencies have chosen different tools for dealing
with that development and the protection of local interests. As this
Article has outlined, each of these approaches has advantages and
disadvantages when balancing efficient and consistent regulatory siting
review with preserving the voice of local governments and residents.
Ultimately, the case law supports the conclusion that increasing
state involvement and limiting local discretionary authority reduces the
complications in the siting process. The method that best balances state
and local interests may depend on the interests of the state itself.
However, through YESS—Yes an Emphasis on Statewide Siting—states
can have a strong voice in setting standards for wind development while
also guiding the process to avoid local regulations intended to hinder
wind development, thus preventing NIMBY from becoming NOPE.

